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THE ‘SHELL BILL’ GAME: AVOIDANCE AND 
THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE  
REBECCA M. KYSAR

 
ABSTRACT 
With increasing frequency, many important revenue laws, such as the 
Affordable Care Act and the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, begin 
as “shell bills.” The Origination Clause of the Constitution aims to place 
decisions over tax policy closer to the people by requiring that bills 
raising revenue begin in the House of Representatives, but the Clause also 
allows the Senate to amend such bills. The Senate has interpreted its 
amendment power broadly, striking the language of a bill passed by the 
House (the shell bill), and replacing it entirely with its own unrelated 
revenue proposal. According to a new challenge against the Affordable 
Care Act, this shell bill game is an unconstitutional sleight of hand 
because it obfuscates the bill’s true origins in the Senate.  
The constitutional fate of the Affordable Care Act and myriad other 
revenue laws, as well as the intra-congressional balance of power over 
revenue policy, turns on the interpretation of the Senate’s power to amend 
revenue legislation, an analysis heretofore unexplored in the academic 
literature. This Article draws upon constitutional text, history, and 
congressional and judicial precedent to conclude that such amendment 
power is broad and, accordingly, that revenue laws that began as shell 
bills do not violate the Origination Clause. This Article also proposes a 
conceptual framework for analyzing existing jurisprudence interpreting 
the Origination Clause—a “legislative process avoidance” doctrine, 
whereby the Court deflects searching review of lawmaking procedures. 
Grounded in constitutional text and history, theories of judicial review, 
and longstanding principles guarding congressional purview over internal 
rules, this legislative process avoidance doctrine further supports 
deference to the Senate’s expansive interpretation of its amendment power 
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without rendering the Clause a nullity. Separation of powers concerns 
also show the doctrine’s promise in other constitutional contexts, such as 
the interpretation of gaps in the lawmaking process left open by Article 1, 
Section 7.  
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INTRODUCTION 
To bring decisions over revenue policy closer to the people, the 
Origination Clause of the Constitution requires that “[a]ll Bills for raising 
Revenue” begin in the House of Representatives.1 Congressional practice 
and judicial decisions interpret the scope of the Clause broadly.
2
 The 
Origination Clause, however, also allows the Senate to “propose or concur 
with Amendments as on other Bills.”3 The Senate has construed its power 
to amend revenue legislation liberally, thus reducing the Clause’s impact.4 
With increasing frequency, the Senate takes a revenue bill passed by the 
House (the “shell bill”5), strikes the language of the bill entirely, and 
replaces it with its own revenue bill unrelated to the one that began in the 
House. Under a narrow view of the Senate’s amendment power, this shell 
bill game is an unconstitutional sleight of hand, obfuscating the bill’s true 
origins in the Senate. Yet it is the path many important pieces of revenue 
legislation, such as the Affordable Care Act, the American Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 2012, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 
and even the Tax Reform Act of 1986, have followed.
6
  
 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. I have discussed the origins and meaning of the Origination 
Clause in another context. See Rebecca M. Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1 (2013) (arguing that tax treaties violate the Origination Clause because the House is not 
involved in the treaty-making process).  
 2. Mary L. Heen, Congress, Public Values, and the Financing of Private Choice, 65 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 853, 874 n.94 (2004) (“[T]he term ‘raising revenue’ has been interpreted by lower federal courts 
as broadly encompassing provisions ‘relating to’ revenue.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 
185–195. 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
 4. See Sean R. Gard, Revival of the Origination Clause in Patent Law: Old Clause Trumps New 
Practice, 16 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 61, 66 (2008) (“Despite the broad interpretation of courts 
concerning what constitutes bills that ‘raise revenue’ in the context of taxation, in practice, the Senate 
still retains considerable authority to amend House bills.”) (quoting from Michael W. Evans, ‘A Source 
of Frequent and Obstinate Altercations’: The History and Application of the Origination Clause, 105 
TAX NOTES 1215, 1232 (Nov. 29, 2004)).  
 5. I use the term “shell bill” as it is used in Capitol Hill parlance—to refer to the 
House-originated revenue bills whose text the Senate completely replaces in order to comply with the 
Origination Clause. See, e.g., John Dickerson, The Invasion of the Bill Snatchers, SLATE (Oct. 6, 2009, 
7:35 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2009/10/the_invasion_of_the_bill 
_snatchers.single.html. The term is also used at the state level to refer to bills with no substantive 
provisions that are introduced to comply with timeliness requirements. This tactic is used either as a 
political strategy or because there is not sufficient time to draft the bill’s contents. See Martha J. 
Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of 
Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103, 112 n.72 
(2001) (discussing Illinois’ use of such shell bills). 
 6. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013); Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 112 Stat. 3765 (2008); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (current version at 26 U.S.C § 1 (2006)). 
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The constitutional fate of these statutes turns on whether the Senate’s 
broad interpretation of its amendment power is correct. On the heels of 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (“NFIB”),7 a 
conservative public interest law firm launched another attack against the 
Affordable Care Act arguing that, in using the shell bill tactic in enacting 
the Act, Congress unconstitutionally circumvented the Origination 
Clause.
8
 Specifically, the complaint alleged that because the individual 
mandate raises revenue, which the Court implicitly confirmed in its 
opinion upholding the mandate under Congress’s taxing power,9 the Act 
should have originated in the House of Representatives. The D.C. District 
Court, citing an earlier draft of this Article and largely adopting the 
interpretive theory of the Senate’s amendment power set forth herein, 
disagreed with this argument and granted the government’s motion to 
dismiss.
10
 At the time of this writing, an appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals is pending.
11
 
In informal writings, some scholars have readily dismissed the 
Origination Clause challenge against the Affordable Care Act.
12
 
Ambiguity surrounding the Clause’s components, however, exposes the 
seriousness of the challenge and indeed implicates profound questions 
concerning the scope of judicial review. No sustained scholarly treatment 
of the Senate’s power to amend revenue legislation exists,13 and the 
Court’s case law leaves many open questions.  
 
 
 7.  132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 8. [Proposed] Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Sissel v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, No. 1:10-cv-01263 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2012).  
 9. The NFIB Court did not address the Origination Clause issue, presumably since the parties 
did not raise it. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, briefly touched upon the Origination Clause but did not 
invoke its direct application. He remarked that the majority’s decision to label the mandate a tax stood 
contrary to Congress’s decision and therefore “invert[ed] the constitutional scheme” by “plac[ing] the 
power to tax in the branch of government least accountable to the citizenry,” in tension with the 
Origination Clause. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2655 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 10. Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10-cv-01263 (D.D.C. June 28, 2013). 
As this Article was going to print, another federal district court dismissed a similar Origination Clause 
challenge, also citing an earlier draft of this Article. Hotze v. Sebelius, No. 4:13-cv-01318, 2014 WL 
109407 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2014). The Texas district court reasoned that the Act was not a revenue bill 
and that, even if it was, the Senate’s amendment power was broad.  
 11. Civil Notice of Appeal, Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, No. 1:10-cv-01263 
(D.D.C. July 5, 2013).  
 12. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Right Strikes Back: A New Legal Challenge for Obamacare, 
THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 17, 2012 12:49 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/09/the-
right-strikes-back-a-new-legal-challenge-for-obamacare/262443/ (implying that the Origination Clause 
challenge to the Affordable Care Act is “off the wall” and “frivolous”).  
  13. One possible exception is a brief essay by a practitioner. John L. Hoffer, Jr., The Origination 
Clause and Tax Legislation, 2 B.U. J. TAX L. 1 (1984). Another is a practitioner’s comparative survey 
of origination clauses at the federal and state levels, which discusses the issue in passing. J. Michael 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE ‘SHELL BILL’ GAME 663 
 
 
 
 
In its most recent interpretation of the Origination Clause, the Court 
pronounced the general enforceability of the Clause, meaning that it is not 
simply up to the House to police the Clause.
14
 This is a departure from the 
Court’s typical unwillingness to entertain challenges involving internal 
congressional procedure,
15
 yet it is less dramatic than previously 
understood. In this Article, I demonstrate that the Supreme Court case law 
under the Origination Clause reveals a pattern: the Court’s interpretation 
of the Clause consistently allows it to avoid intrusion into the legislative 
process, in recognition of separation of powers concerns and its own 
institutional limitations.  
By identifying as the Court’s guide star its reluctance to conduct a 
searching review of the legislative process, this Article thus proposes a 
coherent doctrinal framework for analyzing possible challenges under the 
Origination Clause—a “legislative process avoidance” doctrine. Such an 
approach is grounded in constitutional text and history, as well as theories 
of judicial review and longstanding principles that guard congressional 
purview over the legislative process.
16
 Given its intertwinement with 
congressional procedure and its textual commitment of interpretive 
authority to Congress, the Origination Clause is a particularly appropriate 
setting for a legislative process avoidance doctrine.
17
 General separation of 
powers concerns as embodied in the Rulemaking Clause and the political 
question doctrine, however, also show the doctrine’s promise in other 
constitutional contexts. For instance, the judiciary could invoke the 
 
 
Medina, The Origination Clause in the American Constitution: A Comparative Survey, 23 TULSA L.J. 
165 (1987). Both authors conclude somewhat cursorily that Senate amendments must be germane to 
the original house bill in order to give proper effect to the Origination Clause, a conclusion with which 
I disagree. See also Michael W. Evans, ‘A Source of Frequent and Obstinate Altercations’: The 
History and Application of the Origination Clause, TAX HIST. PROJECT (Nov. 29, 2004), available at 
www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/8149692C128846EF85256F5F000F3D67?OpenDocument 
(providing an account of existing congressional and judicial precedent interpreting the Senate’s 
amendment power). 
 14. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990). 
 15. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1021–25 (2011) 
(discussing endogeneity, i.e. the interpretation and enforcement of legislative rules by the adopting 
body); Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 519, 553–62 (2009) (providing an overview of legislative rules in the context of a 
special interest disclosure regime).  
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings 
. . . .”).  
 17. This phrase, I coin, is a play upon the constitutional avoidance doctrine, which counsels that 
the Supreme Court should avoid resolving cases on constitutional grounds (instead resolving them on 
other grounds). See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). Although the doctrines differ in obvious regards, they are both premised on the proper 
scope of judicial review.  
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doctrine to defer to Congress in interpreting gaps left open by Article 1, 
Section 7.
18
  
The legislative process avoidance doctrine prescribes that the Court 
defer to the Senate’s interpretation of its amendment power under the 
Origination Clause, a conclusion that is supported by the Clause’s text. 
The Origination Clause’s grant of such power to the Senate “as on other 
Bills”19 represents submission to Senate procedure. Moreover, the Senate’s 
broad interpretation of its amendment power is wholly supported by the 
text and history of the Clause, as well as by congressional and judicial 
precedent. Thus, even an amendment in the form of a wholesale substitute 
should and will most likely survive constitutional scrutiny. This would be 
the case even where the amendment converted the measure from 
revenue-decreasing or revenue-neutrality to revenue-increasing (as 
occurred in the Affordable Care Act context).  
It is important to clarify that the institutional argument for a legislative 
process avoidance doctrine in the Origination Clause context is necessarily 
intertwined with the substantive constitutional analysis of how broadly to 
construe the amendment power since the textual grant of permission to the 
Senate to amend “as on other Bills” constitutes deference to that body. In 
this Article, however, I also canvass additional textual, historical, and 
precedential arguments to justify the Senate’s interpretation. Additionally, 
I offer theoretical arguments for a legislative process avoidance doctrine 
that may support its application to situations where the constitutional grant 
of deference is not so clear.  
The approach outlined herein avoids judicial inquiries into the 
acceptable degree of an amendment’s germaneness to the original bill and 
the revenue effects of a bill amidst a changing macroeconomic 
environment—all nettlesome endeavors fraught with impracticalities and 
separation of powers concerns. This broad interpretation of the Senate’s 
power to amend revenue legislation thus continues a trend identified in 
other constitutional contexts—Congress, not the courts, is the proper 
avenue for recourse against unfair taxation.
20
 Judicial deference to the 
 
 
 18. For instance, the judiciary, under the legislative process avoidance doctrine, should defer to 
Congress in formulating the precise requirements of whether a bill “passes” a house or whether the 
House or Senate could assign to a committee the power to present a passed bill to the President. 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 20. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 548 (1869) (“The power to tax may be 
exercised oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility of the legislature is not to the courts, but to 
the people by whom its members are elected. So if a particular tax bears heavily upon a corporation, or 
a class of corporations, it cannot, for that reason only, be pronounced contrary to the Constitution.”); 
McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 55 (1904) (stating that recourse for abuses of the taxing power 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/6
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elected branch in the Origination Clause context is especially appropriate 
given the Clause’s origins in protecting democracy over tax policy. 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I discuss the history of the 
Origination Clause, as well as its purpose of creating democratically sound 
revenue legislation. In Part II, I propose a framework for understanding 
the doctrine under the Origination Clause; generally, the Court, motivated 
by concerns for institutional competency and separation of powers, avoids 
judicial reconstruction of the legislative process. This legislative process 
avoidance doctrine predicts an expansive interpretation of the Senate’s 
amendment power, a reading that is also supported by constitutional text, 
history, and precedent. In Part III, I draw upon theories of judicial review 
and traditional separation of powers principles to justify using the 
legislative process avoidance doctrine in interpreting the Origination 
Clause and to suggest the doctrine’s possible application to other 
constitutional contexts. In this Part, I also discuss why the Senate’s broad 
amendment power mutes the Clause’s effect but by no means vitiates it 
since the House still retains agenda control.
21
 Finally, in Part IV, I apply 
the legislative process avoidance doctrine to the context of healthcare 
reform, predicting that the Origination Clause challenge to the Affordable 
Care Act will fail.  
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE 
The Origination Clause has roots in fourteenth-century England where 
the elected House of Commons originated revenue bills with subsequent 
 
 
lies “in the people, upon whom, after all, under our institutions, reliance must be placed for the 
correction of abuses committed in the exercise of a lawful power”); Edward D. Kleinbard, 
Constitutional Kreplach, TAX NOTES, Aug. 16, 2010, at 757 (“[T]he Constitution can best be 
understood as contemplating that the principal remedy for harsh, oppressive, or stupid tax legislation is 
to vote the rascals out.”); Jonathan Rosenberg, Comment, The Origination Clause, the Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and the Role of the Judiciary, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 419, 451 n.165 
(1983) (“Traditionally, it has been the policy of the courts to defer to Congress in constitutional claims 
involving tax legislation, especially in the area of equal protection.”).  
 21. Indeed, in prior work, I have taken the position that the democratic benefits of the House’s 
participation in revenue policy, among other considerations, mandate a role for the House in the tax 
treaty process as a constitutional matter. See Kysar, supra note 1. In the tax treaty context, the House’s 
complete omission from the process is particularly egregious. In contrast, a broad amendment power 
does not pose the same affront to the democratic rationales motivating the Origination Clause since the 
House still retains agenda-setting ability. See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of 
Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 424–25 (2004) (describing the advantage bestowed 
upon the House by the Origination Clause even in the face of a broad amendment power); see also 
infra notes 262–66 and accompanying text. 
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666 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:659 
 
 
 
 
action by the House of Lords, which was appointed by the crown.
22
 The 
justification for this practice abroad was the lower house’s accountability 
to the people, which would minimize arbitrary, unfair, and overly 
burdensome taxes.
23
 One notable feature of the English practice was the 
House of Lords’ inability to substantively amend revenue bills originating 
in the House of Commons.
24
 The American colonies largely adhered to the 
custom of giving the lower chambers the power to originate money bills, 
eight of which codified the power in their charters by the time of the 
Constitutional Convention.
25
 Several of those clauses, however, deviated 
from the English practice and allowed Senate amendments.
26
 
At the federal level, one of the principal defects of the Articles of 
Confederation was the inability of the federal government to raise revenue, 
which had subsequently resulted in economic turmoil and “national 
humiliation” according to Alexander Hamilton.27 The Constitutional 
Convention was, in part, convened to expand the federal government’s 
power to tax.
28
 The expansion of the taxing power, in and of itself, proved 
noncontroversial; however, the procedural mechanism through which 
taxes would be imposed sparked debate.
29
  
Delegates from large states invoked the power to originate revenue 
bills in the lower house as a counterweight to the powers of the Senate.
30
 
Delegates also used democratic principles to justify the Origination 
Clause, which gave control over initiating revenue matters to the directly 
elected House of Representatives, rather than the Senate whose members 
were elected by state legislatures. After the origination power was placed 
 
 
 22. 1 DAVID K. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY, 
APPLICATION, AND CONSTRUCTION 342 (1910); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 315 (abr. photo. reprint 1987) (1833).  
 23. STORY, supra note 22, at 315. 
 24. Id. at 639–43. 
 25. Michael B. Rappaport, The President’s Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 735, 
765 n.118 (1993). 
 26. Of the eleven states adopting new constitutions after the revolution, four forbade the upper 
house from originating or amending revenue bills (New Jersey, South Carolina, Virginia, and 
Maryland), and three allowed the upper house to amend, although not originate, such bills (Delaware, 
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire). Two states had no version of the origination privilege (North 
Carolina and New York), and two others did not have bicameral legislatures (Pennsylvania and 
Georgia). Id. 
 27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 28. Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1999). 
 29. Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 423. 
 30. After one instance of the Clause’s removal during debate, Edmund Randolph argued that the 
House required its inclusion as “compensation at least for giving up the point of proportional 
representation in the Senate.” WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 111 (1987). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/6
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in the House, the Framers enhanced the democratic functions of the Clause 
by requiring a larger number of members, proportionate representation, 
and shorter terms in the House.
31
 The Framers hoped these characteristics 
would further ensure that the House would design revenue policy in a 
manner that was closest to the people’s wishes.32 Although the 
Seventeenth Amendment would later result in direct election of the Senate, 
thereby reducing somewhat the Senate’s insularity from public opinion,33 
the House, and the House alone, retains these other attributes.
34
 
Edmund Randolph of Virginia first proposed the basic, bicameral 
structure of the legislature as part of the “Virginia Plan.” In its original 
incarnation, the Virginia Plan did not discuss any restriction on either 
house’s role in originating revenue bills.35 Charles Pinckney of South 
Carolina proposed as a modification to the plan that “[a]ll money bills of 
every kind shall originate in the House of Delegates, and shall not be 
altered by the Senate.”36 The convention body defeated Pinckney’s 
proposal, arguing that both houses should have the power to originate 
revenue legislation.
37
 
The Virginia Plan proved divisive. Nationalists preferred its 
replacement of state-based representation with a proportionate system and 
were joined by delegates from the large states. The anti-federalists feared 
the plan’s concentration of national power, and delegates from small states 
objected to their dilution of power under the plan. To break this deadlock, 
a special committee was formed to produce the “Great Compromise.” In 
 
 
 31. James Madison, in a speech to the newly formed House of Representatives on May 15, 1789, 
made this point:  
The constitution . . . places the power in the House of originating money bills. The principal 
reason . . . was, because [its members] were chosen by the People, and supposed to be best 
acquainted with their interests, and ability. In order to make them more particularly 
acquainted with these objects, the democratic branch of the Legislature consisted of a greater 
number, and were chosen for a shorter period, so that they might revert more frequently to the 
mass of the People.  
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 356 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 
FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.  
 34. Although the members of the House have shorter terms and thus are theoretically more 
responsive to their constituents, gerrymandering has muted this benefit by creating “safe” seats in the 
House. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice 
Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1334 (1994) (positing that gerrymandering results in longer 
tenure of representatives). 
 35. Hoffer, supra note 13, at 3. 
 36. 5 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
129 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1861) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. 
 37. ARTHUR TAYLOR PRESCOTT, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 86 (1941). 
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exchange for the grant of equal representation in the Senate to the small 
states, the Great Compromise provided that “all bills for raising or 
appropriating money . . . shall originate in the first branch of the 
legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the second branch 
. . . .”38 
Although the Origination Clause thus became linked to the Great 
Compromise,
39
 with several delegates from large states threatening to 
thwart the Convention rather than forgo the origination privilege,
40
 the 
Clause remained the subject of heated debate. Subsequent to the Great 
Compromise, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts argued “that the people 
ought to hold the purse-strings,”41 proposing very similar language to the 
first draft of the Clause, including its prohibition on amendments by the 
Senate. Several delegates agreed with Gerry’s proposal, including George 
Mason and Benjamin Franklin, who concluded that the power over 
revenue affairs should be given to the immediate representatives of the 
populace so that the nation would not be in danger of becoming an 
aristocracy.
42
  
Other delegates, however, opposed the Clause over the course of the 
Convention. Pinckney, although the drafter of the first incarnation of the 
Clause, invoked his own state’s undesirable experience with a similar 
provision, which was routinely evaded and caused strife between the two 
houses.
43
 James Madison echoed these opinions, also arguing that the 
Senate would prove more capable than the House.
44
 Still others cautioned 
against following the English model since, unlike England’s House of 
Lords, both houses in the new nation would be elected bodies.
45
 Some 
delegates from small states also thought relinquishing the power to 
originate money bills too great a sacrifice for equal representation in the 
Senate.
46
 
 
 
 38. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 36, at 194.  
 39. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 31, at 514 (“[M]embers from large States set great value 
on this privilege of originating money bills. Of this the members from the small States, with some 
from the large States who wished a high mounted Govt, endeavored to avail themselves, by making 
that privilege, the price of arrangements in the constitution favorable to the small States, and to the 
elevation of the Government.”). 
 40. Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 423. 
 41. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 113 (Adrienne 
Koch ed., 1966) [hereinafter “MADISON’S NOTES”]. 
 42. Id. at 304–06.  
 43. Id. at 114. 
 44. Id. at 113, 238. 
 45. 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 36, at 188–89 (noting views of Butler, Madison, Pinckney, 
and Sherman).  
 46. See, e.g., 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 36, at 394 (recounting the position of John Francis 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/6
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Nonetheless, the Clause’s ability to mollify delegates from the large 
states would ensure its later survival. Gerry’s proposal eventually passed 
nine to one.
47
 To cure perceived shortcomings, however, Edmund 
Randolph submitted a version that clarified that the Clause only applied to 
“bills for raising money for the purpose of revenue.”48 This change was 
made in order to exclude from the Clause’s scope bills under which money 
incidentally arose.
49
 This proposed language also responded to the concern 
that the House would “tack” on to revenue bills other unrelated matters.50  
Randolph’s proposal gave the power to amend revenue bills to the 
Senate, but not in such a way as to “increase or diminish the sum to be 
raised, or change the mode of levying it.”51 The grant of an amendment 
power to the Senate would ultimately secure the Clause’s place in the 
Constitution. George Mason, for instance, supported Randolph’s proposal 
because the failure to give amendment powers to the Senate would 
problematically prevent the Senate from correcting errors or from 
defending its purview over foreign affairs.
52
 He thought the latter concern 
to be acute given the danger that the House of Representatives would 
“tack[] foreign matter to money bills.”53  
Although Randolph’s version seemed to resolve some of the 
shortcomings in the prior bill, James Madison argued that it would create 
new ambiguities. Under Madison’s view, doubt and altercation would 
arise as to whether revenue had merely incidental effects, as well as over 
the precise meaning of the Senate’s amendment power.54 As to the latter 
point, Madison worried that the Senate might use its amendment powers to 
include extraneous material, thus requiring inquiry into the degree of 
connection between the subject matter of the bill and the amendment.
55
 He 
also was of the view that Randolph’s version should be altered to at least 
allow the Senate “to diminish the sums to be raised.”56  
 
 
Mercer). This view was not universally shared. Madison would argue that the origination privilege was 
of little consequence since “[a]mendments could be handed privately by the Senate to members in the 
other House.” Id. at 274. 
 47. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 41, at 441. 
 48. Id. at 442. 
 49. Id. at 441–42. 
 50. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 31, at 273. 
 51. Id. at 273. 
 52. 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 36, at 415 (statement of George Mason). 
 53. Id. 
 54. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 41, at 446. 
 55. Id. 
 56. PRESCOTT, supra note 37, at 444 (emphasis in original). 
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On September 5, 1787, the delegates offered a near final form of the 
Origination Clause. Instead of limiting the Clause to bills “for the purpose 
of revenue,” the new draft applied to “bills for raising revenue.” The 
Clause gave the power to the Senate to “alter[]” or “amend[]” such bills,57 
thus broadening the amendment power envisioned by Randolph. At this 
point, the delegates from the large states became amenable to the view of 
the small states that equal representation in the Senate did not serve as a 
sufficient counterweight to the origination privilege. They thus agreed to 
postpone consideration of the Clause until the remainder of the Senate’s 
powers were delineated—specifically, its powers in the realm of 
appointments, treaty-making, presidential selection, and impeachments.
58
 
The small states, pleased with the strengthening of the Senate’s powers, 
finally acquiesced to the Origination Clause. Three days later, the 
language of the Origination Clause was finalized,
 59
 which applied to “bills 
for raising revenue.” It also tracked the language of the Massachusetts 
Constitution in granting the Senate the ability to “propose or concur with 
Amendments as on other Bills.”60  
Madison, originally an opponent of the Clause, would later attempt to 
assuage residents of New York who were grieved by the weakening of the 
Clause through the Senate’s amendment power, arguing that the diluted 
Clause would still prove powerful:  
The House of Representatives can not only refuse, but they alone 
can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of government. 
They, in a word, hold the purse . . . . This power over the purse, may 
in fact be regarded as the most compleat [sic] and effectual weapon 
with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives 
of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for 
carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.
61
 
Years later, however, the concession of the Senate’s amendment power 
would still sting for some. Gerry, in a letter dated eleven years after the 
Convention, would argue that the Senate’s amendment power violated the 
compromise and rendered the Origination Clause ineffective. For these 
reasons, Gerry stated he would never have consented to equal 
 
 
 57. 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 36, at 510. 
 58. Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 428; 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 36, at 511. 
 59. PRESCOTT, supra note 37, at 450–51. 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1; see MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 41, at 607. 
 61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison). 
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representation in the Senate in light of the final version of the Clause.
62
 
The scope of the Senate’s amendment power, and hence the gravity of the 
large states’ concession, is the subject of the remainder of this Article.  
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE 
As Part I summarizes, the Framers included the Origination Clause to 
further democratic principles and to mollify the large states. Although 
James Madison warned of the difficulty in enforcing and interpreting the 
Clause,
63
 the Convention presumably adopted it because its benefits 
outweighed these concerns. Nonetheless, Madison’s warnings would 
prove prescient. This Part discusses the jurisprudence interpreting the 
Clause, synthesizing the Court’s decisions as animated by its 
unwillingness to breach legislative prerogative, an approach that I label the 
“legislative process avoidance” doctrine. This Part concludes by applying 
the “legislative process avoidance” doctrine to predict judicial deference to 
the Senate’s broad reading of its amendment power, a reading that I 
defend as a substantive matter through examination of history, text, and 
precedent. 
A. Judicial Enforceability of the Origination Clause 
The primary method by which the Origination Clause is enforced is by 
a House resolution returning a bill to the Senate (this practice is known as 
“blue-slipping” because the resolution is printed on blue paper).64 
Typically, challenges against Congress’s failure to adhere to rules 
governing its lawmaking process are unenforceable by the Court.
65
 Such a 
result is premised on separation of powers concerns and each house’s 
authority over its own rules under the Rulemaking Clause of the 
Constitution.
66
  
 
 
 62. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 31, at 265–67.  
 63. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 31, at 276. 
 64. House Rule IX, clause 2(a)(1) provides for this process. Other informal means of enforcing 
the Clause are as follows: (1) ignoring a Senate-passed revenue bill; (2) using a conference committee 
to decide Origination Clause questions; and (3) omitting the revenue portions of the offending bill. 
JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31399, THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION: INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT 9, 12 (2011).  
 65. See, e.g., Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (denying review of 
the House’s allocation of committee seats except in cases of “constitutional infirmity”); see also 
Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 15, at 1021–25 (discussing the non-reviewability of legislative 
rules); Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 15, at 553–62 (same). 
 66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings 
. . . .”). Courts generally interpret this Clause to stand for the proposition that legislative rules are 
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Indeed, early on, the Court refused to review requirements for passing 
legislation, even if set forth in the Constitution. In Field v. Clark, the 
Court held that it could not second-guess the legislative practice whereby 
the presiding congressional officer attests that the bill presented to the 
President is the one signed by Congress (the “enrolled bill” doctrine).67 
Accordingly, the Field Court declined to examine evidence presented by 
the plaintiffs that the congressional journals indicated that the statute 
signed by the President in fact differed from the one passed by the House 
and the Senate.
68
  
In so doing, the Field Court concluded that Congress was free to 
designate the process by which the passage of a bill is authenticated.
69
 
According to the Court, because the signing of the bill by the presiding 
officers of each house was official attestation as to the bill’s contents in 
accordance with internal rules, “[t]he respect due to coequal and 
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that 
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated 
in the manner stated.”70 The Court discounted any risk that the presiding 
officers would conspire to attest to a bill that was never passed by 
Congress. Instead, the Court expressed concern that an opposite 
conclusion would result in uncertain laws whose validity is dependent 
upon subordinate officers in charge of keeping the journals of each 
house.
71
  
Nearly one hundred years later and in apparent tension with this 
precedent,
72
 the United States v. Munoz-Flores Court held justiciable the 
issue of whether legislation complied with the Origination Clause and 
ultimately concluded that the law at issue (a statute that imposed monetary 
penalties on persons convicted of federal misdemeanors) fell outside the 
scope of the Clause.
73
 In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia critiqued the 
majority by arguing that the enrolled bill doctrine requires that the Court 
not consider where, in fact, the revenue bill had originated and instead 
defer to Congress’s designation of the bill’s origination in the House 
 
 
beyond the scrutiny of the judicial branch.  
 67. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670–71 (1982). See also United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 
U.S. 385, 408–10 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing from Field).  
 68. Field, 143 U.S. at 650.  
 69. Id. at 671. 
 70. Id. at 672. 
 71. Id. at 673. 
 72. This tension is further explored below. See infra notes 235–40 and accompanying text. 
 73. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 401 (1990). 
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(albeit factually incorrect).
74
 Such an approach would not, according to 
Scalia, make Origination Clause challenges categorically non-justiciable—
instead, the judiciary could intervene when Congress had designated the 
legislation as originating in the Senate.
75
  
The Munoz-Flores majority, in a somewhat cryptic footnote, rejected 
Scalia’s argument by distinguishing Field because it did not implicate a 
constitutional requirement binding upon Congress, such as the Origination 
Clause.
76
 The Court also rejected the argument that the case presented a 
non-justiciable political question. In analyzing the factors enumerated in 
Baker v. Carr that raise such questions,
77
 the Court dismissed the 
argument that invalidating a law on Origination Clause grounds entailed a 
“lack of respect” for Congress’s judgment sufficient to create a political 
question.
78
 The Court also discredited the Government’s contention that 
the House’s incentives to protect its “institutional prerogatives” or the 
Origination Clause’s failure to implicate individual rights obviated the 
need for judicial intervention.
79
 
Even in light of Munoz-Flores, separation of powers principles, in fact, 
permeate the case law under the Origination Clause. Although the Court 
does not defer to Congress’s certification as to a bill’s origins, its 
understanding of “bills for raising revenue” and other interpretations of the 
Clause avoid judicial ensnarement in the legislative process. Thus, 
although the holding in Munoz-Flores is somewhat incongruous with the 
holding in Field, examination of Origination Clause jurisprudence reveals 
that Munoz-Flores’s departure from prior case law is perhaps not as stark 
as previously understood.  
B. The Scope of the Origination Clause 
1. Funds for the General Treasury as a Proxy for “Revenue Raising” 
The Supreme Court has spoken on the meaning of the Origination 
Clause only a handful of times, but commentators have ascertained two 
rules that the Court has invoked to narrow its scope: (1) raising revenue 
must be the primary purpose, rather than an incidental consequence, of the 
 
 
 74. Id. at 409–10 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 75. Id. at 410. 
 76. Id. at 391 n.4 (majority opinion). 
 77. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). These factors are discussed in more detail below. 
See infra text accompanying notes 250–53. 
 78. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 390–91. 
 79. Id. at 392–95. 
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legislation; and (2) such revenues must be for general government 
coffers.
80
 The Court, however, has never denied an Origination Clause 
challenge solely on the basis of the first condition. Instead, the Court 
invokes the second as a proxy for the first; if a statute funds the general 
treasury instead of a specific program or service, it has a primary purpose 
of raising revenue. Alternatively, if the statute funds a specific activity or 
segment, it falls outside the scope of the Clause. The Court’s use of these 
objective facts as proxies for predominant purpose likely emanates from 
its reluctance to review the legislative process to unearth legislative intent. 
United States v. Norton is a case often cited for the Court’s concern 
that revenue-raising must be the primary purpose of the legislation in order 
to fall under the Origination Clause.
81
 Notably, however, the Norton case 
did not even involve the Origination Clause.
82
 The misunderstanding 
arises from the Court’s analogy to the Origination Clause, which it 
reasoned must have been in the minds of Congress in drafting a statute of 
limitations that applied to violations of “revenue laws.” In so doing, the 
Norton Court cited to Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution for the 
proposition that the Origination Clause was “confined to bills to levy taxes 
in the strict sense of the words, and has not been understood to extend to 
bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.”83 The 
Court then reasoned that the purpose of the act under which the defendant 
embezzler was charged was to promote greater security and convenience 
in the transmission of money through the mail system, rather than to create 
revenues. Thus, the defendant did not benefit from the shorter statute of 
limitations that applied to violations of revenue laws. 
In exploring the meaning of revenue bills for purposes of the 
Origination Clause, however, the Court does not reconstruct congressional 
purpose. The Court’s failure to do so in the constitutional context is 
appropriate since attribution of congressional purpose might mean 
invalidation of the statute. By contrast, in the statutory context, the Court 
is merely trying to effectuate congressional intent. Twin City Bank of New 
 
 
 80. SATURNO, supra note 64, at 8. 
 81. United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566 (1875). 
 82. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 885 F.2d 36, 40–41 (3d Cir. 1989) (misconstruing Norton 
as an Origination Clause case); United States v. Herrada, 887 F.2d 524, 525–26 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); 
United States v. Tholl, 895 F.2d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Greene, 709 F. 
Supp. 636, 637 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (same, citing Norton as among “[n]umerous Supreme Court decisions 
[holding] that origination clause restraints do not extend to bills that incidentally create revenue if 
those bills were enacted for purposes other than revenue raising”). 
 83. Norton, 91 U.S. at 569 (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES ch. XIII, § 877 (1833)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE ‘SHELL BILL’ GAME 675 
 
 
 
 
Brighton v. Nebeker, an Origination Clause case, involved the National 
Banking Act, which imposed a tax on a banking association’s average 
amount of circulating notes in order to establish a currency backed by 
United States bonds.
84
 Significantly, the taxes were not deposited to the 
general Treasury but instead were earmarked specifically to fund the 
expenses in printing and circulating the bonds.
85
 Because the tax 
functioned as a means for the currency, the Court was convinced that 
Congress had no purpose to raise revenue “in meeting the expenses or 
obligations of the Government.”86 Thus, although the Court was interested 
in whether a revenue-raising purpose existed, it looked to the direct 
funding of the currency through the tax, rather than searching the 
legislative record, to make its determination. 
Less than a decade later, in Millard v. Roberts, the Court held that a bill 
taxing property in the District of Columbia so that it could fund railroad 
terminals and the elimination of railroad crossings in the District was not a 
bill to raise revenue.
87
 The funds raised by the taxes were distributed to the 
railroad corporations to effectuate these changes. The Court cited Nebeker 
to conclude that the taxes “are but means to the purposes provided by the 
act” rather than a means to fund the general expenses of the federal 
government.
88
 
More recently, in Munoz-Flores, discussed above, the Court held that a 
law imposing a monetary “special assessment” on persons convicted of a 
misdemeanor did not constitute a tax.
89
 The Court reasoned that revenue 
bills are not bills “for other purposes which may incidentally create 
revenue.”90 Importantly, the Court characterized its case law interpreting 
this phrase “to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental 
program and that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a 
statute that raises revenue to support Government generally, is not a ‘Bil[l] 
for raising Revenue’ within the meaning of the Origination Clause.”91 
Rather than reconstructing congressional intent to determine whether the 
bill was enacted for non-revenue purposes, the Court concluded that the 
 
 
 84. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897). 
 85. Id. at 198–99. 
 86. Id. at 203. 
 87. Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436–37 (1906). 
 88. Id. at 437. 
 89. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 398 (1990). The Court stated in dicta that a 
different result might occur where the program funded is “entirely unrelated to the persons paying for 
the program,” thus indicating that it was also concerned about the close connection between the payor-
criminals and the program, which benefitted victims of criminals. Id. at 400 n.7. 
 90. Id. at 397 (citing Twin City Bank, 167 U.S. at 196). 
 91. Id. at 398. 
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special assessments were used to assist crime victims rather than deposited 
into the general Treasury and thus the bill was not a revenue bill.
92
 
A review of the Supreme Court case law construing the scope of the 
Origination Clause thus fails to support judicial inquiry into Congress’s 
purpose in enacting a statute. Rather, the Court takes as a proxy that such 
purpose is non-revenue-raising when the structure of the statute earmarks 
revenues to fund a program it creates.  
Indeed, in light of the purposes of the Origination Clause, it seems 
justifiable to exclude from the Clause’s ambit those funds that are solicited 
as fees or to fund a specific government program. In such cases, the need 
for accountability is lessened since taxpayers can judge for themselves 
whether the taxes are worth what is essentially a voluntary payment in a 
quid pro quo transaction. Revenues that are for the general treasury, 
including regulatory taxes, however, will be used for general government 
services. The loose nexus between the taxes and their benefits, in the latter 
case, may result in insufficient monitoring by the public and hence unfair 
taxation, against which the Origination Clause was meant to protect. 
2. The Murky Line Between Regulatory and Revenue-Raising Taxes 
a. Analogy to the Taxing Power Cases 
Rather than conducting a searching review of congressional purpose in 
the Origination Clause context, the Court has chosen to instead carve out 
from the Clause’s application statutes that generate revenues for a specific 
purpose or program. In other contexts, the Court has taken a similar 
approach to explicitly discard “distinctions between regulatory and 
revenue-raising taxes.”93  
It is worthwhile to briefly explore one such context, the Court’s taxing 
power jurisprudence, since the Court’s failure to police the boundary 
between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes in cases involving the taxing 
power supports the above reading of the case law under the Origination 
Clause; the prudential considerations underlying the Court’s approach in 
the taxing power context apply equally in the Origination Clause context. 
Additionally, this discussion will later inform the inquiry, discussed in 
Part IV, of whether the Court’s determination that the individual mandate 
 
 
 92. Id. at 399–401. 
 93. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974) (discussing the meaning of “tax” 
for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act). 
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constitutes a tax for purposes of the taxing power necessarily means the 
mandate falls within the scope of the Origination Clause.  
In the context of the taxing power, the Court has reasoned that “[e]very 
tax is in some measure regulatory”94 and an opposite conclusion would 
require examination of hidden legislative motivations.
95
 In its recent health 
care decision, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 
(“NFIB”), the Court reaffirmed its hesitation to distinguish between 
regulatory measures and taxes.
96
  
At issue in NFIB was the constitutionality of the individual mandate, 
which requires that most Americans maintain a “minimum essential” 
amount of health insurance coverage.
97
 Those that do not comply must 
make a “shared responsibility payment” to the Internal Revenue Service 
when filing income taxes.
98
 Referring to this payment as a “penalty,” the 
Act provides that it “shall be assessed and collected in the same manner” 
as other tax penalties.
99
 The amount of the payment is determined by 
taxable income, number of dependents, and joint filing status, and does not 
apply at all to those individuals that do not pay federal income tax.
100
  
In NFIB, the Supreme Court reasoned that these features, along with 
the significant revenue-raising function of the mandate (estimated at $4 
billion per year), meant that the individual mandate constituted a tax, thus 
falling under Congress’s taxing power.101 In so doing, the Court did not 
allow Congress’s decision to label the mandate a “penalty” rather than a 
“tax” to govern.102 The NFIB Court further pointed out that the mandate 
was akin to a tax, rather than a penalty, because (1) the amount due for 
most Americans would be much less than the price of insurance, and 
indeed cannot exceed such price, (2) the provision lacked a scienter 
requirement, and (3) the IRS enforced it through “normal means of 
taxation” (rather than criminal prosecution).103 
Importantly for our purposes, the Court also concluded that, although 
the mandate was designed to influence conduct, it could still be considered 
 
 
 94. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) (upholding as within the scope of the 
taxing power an annual license tax upon sellers of firearms). 
 95. Id.  
 96. Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2596–97, 2599–2600 (2012). 
 97. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. V 2012). 
 98. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1). 
 99. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c), (g)(1). 
 100. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(3), (c)(2), (c)(4), (e)(2). 
 101. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96. 
 102. Id. at 2597–98.  
 103. Id. at 2595–96. 
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a valid exercise of the taxing power.
104
 The Court cited to case law 
upholding taxes that were obviously regulatory, such as taxes on 
marijuana,
105
 concluding that taxes necessarily shape behavior by serving 
as an “economic impediment to the activity taxed.”106 Although the Court 
has thus rejected a bright line distinction between taxes and regulation, 
recognizing that they are on a spectrum, it also suggested that some 
regulatory taxes may fall so far on the regulation side that they risk 
recharacterization as penalties, such as when the tax is so burdensome that 
individuals have no choice but to pay it.
107
 If a provision raises revenue 
and does not constitute a penalty, however, it will generally receive the 
protection of the taxing power, which in light of NFIB and prior case law, 
appears to be quite broad.
108
  
b. Factors Motivating the Court’s Non-Distinction Between 
Regulatory and Revenue-Raising Taxes 
As discussed above, in the taxing power context, the Court explicitly 
rejects a distinction between revenues and exactions that regulate 
behavior.
109
 I have argued that, in the Origination Clause context, the 
 
 
 104. Id. at 2596.  
 105. Id. (citing United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44–45 (1950) and Sonzinsky v. United 
States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937)). 
 106. Id. (quoting Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513). 
 107. See id. at 2595. Roberts cited to a Lochner-era case, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., which 
recharacterized a ten percent tax upon the income of businesses that hired children as a penalty falling 
outside of Congress’ taxing power. 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922). Some commentators had considered 
Drexel Furniture and its progeny to no longer be good law. See Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and 
the Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 27, 28 (2010), available at 
http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/889.pdf (“[T]he best reading [of existing doctrine] is that courts 
will not impose any substantive limits on the uses to which Congress may put its taxing authority. Any 
confusion results from the Court’s failure to formally overrule outdated precedents that once suggested 
otherwise.”). The NFIB opinion, however, seems to have revived the distinction between taxes and 
penalties. 
 108. Even the dissenting Justices agreed that Congress had the power to constitutionally impose a 
tax to achieve the mandate’s purpose. The question was only whether it had done so. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2651; see Linda Sugin, The Great and Mighty Tax Law: How the Roberts Court Has Reduced 
Constitutional Scrutiny of Taxes and Tax Expenditures, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 777 (2013). Indeed, “[t]he 
NFIB decision emphasizes Congress’s power to tax where it cannot constitutionally regulate.” Id. at 
796. For cases construing the taxing power broadly, see License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 
(1866) (“[T]he power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. . . . [I]t reaches every subject, and 
may be exercised at discretion.”); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953) (“It is axiomatic 
that the power of Congress to tax is extensive and sometimes falls with crushing effect . . . . As is well 
known, the constitutional restraints on taxing are few.”).  
 109. In the taxing power context, the Court draws a distinction between taxes and penalties. In that 
context, federalism concerns arising from penalties warrant such a distinction. See Ruth Mason, 
Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1030 (2011) (discussing how tax penalties 
may crowd out state regulation of the same area). This may explain the Court’s failure to focus on a 
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Court implicitly takes this position. Some lower courts even conflate the 
questions of what constitutes a tax for purposes of the taxing power and 
what falls within the scope of the Origination Clause.
110
 Others analyze the 
scope of the two clauses differently.
111
  
There is an argument to be made that the text of the Origination Clause 
requires examination of the purpose of the legislation since it applies only 
to “Bills for raising Revenue,”112 as opposed to the taxing power, which 
contains no such preposition.
113
 Although the Clause as written is more 
limited than earlier incarnations that addressed “bills for raising money,” 
notably, the delegates rejected language in a proposal that would have 
limited the Clause to “bills for raising money for the purpose of 
revenue.”114 The Framers may have dropped this phrase in response to 
Madison’s warning that whether the collection of revenue was the primary 
purpose of a bill would prove a vexing question: 
The proposed substitute, which in some respects lessened the 
objection [against] the section, had a contrary effect with respect to 
this particular. It laid a foundation for new difficulties and disputes 
between the two houses. The word revenue was ambiguous. In 
many acts, particularly in the regulations of trade, the object would 
be twofold. The raising of revenue would be one of them. How 
could it be determined which was the primary or predominant one; 
or whether it was necessary that revenue [should] be the sole object, 
in exclusion even of other incidental effects.
115
 
Additionally, it is difficult to see why revenue policy would not fall within 
the Framers’ desire to prevent unfair taxation simply because such policy 
was employed to achieve regulatory ends.
116
 After all, immediately 
 
 
provision’s penalty-like features in the Origination Clause context. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 
495 U.S. 385 (1990) (focusing on the use of revenues rather than the penalty-like features of the 
special assessment at issue). 
 110. See, e.g., South Carolina ex rel Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding 
that price controls on milk were not revenue-raising for purposes of the Origination Clause, citing to 
case law interpreting the taxing power). 
 111. See Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 427 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]axing 
Clause and Origination Clause challenges . . . represent separate lines of analysis.”). 
 112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes . . . to 
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”).  
 114. PRESCOTT, supra note 37, at 441 (emphasis in original). 
 115. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 41, at 445–46. 
 116. The aim of the taxing power is similarly broad. The Constitution allows it to be invoked to 
“provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 1. The breadth of the taxing power reflected profound dissatisfaction with the inability of the 
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subsequent to the signing of the Constitution, tariffs constituted the 
primary source of federal revenue,
117
 and as Madison’s quotation 
demonstrates, it was not lost upon the Framers that the import duties 
would have had a regulatory effect by stimulating domestic productions.
118
  
As Madison warned, drawing a line between revenue-raising and other 
legislative activity proves very difficult since taxes perform many 
functions.
119
 The government’s ability to shape taxpayer behavior through 
the tax system rather than through other means has been widely 
recognized as a powerful tool in its policy repertoire.
120
 Congress “spends” 
through the tax law by offering tax breaks to reward certain behavior. To 
highlight the equivalency between tax benefits and government spending, 
Stanley Surrey famously labeled tax provisions that deviate from the goal 
of measuring the tax base as “tax expenditures.”121 Congress may also 
penalize certain behaviors by overtaxing them relative to the tax base, 
provisions which Ruth Mason categorizes as “tax penalties.”122  
As a general matter, unearthing legislative purpose is a notoriously 
controversial task.
123
 The hybrid nature of taxes makes the Court’s search 
 
 
national government to finance itself under the Articles of Confederation by taxing individuals 
directly. Although the Taxing Clause solved the immediate problem of repayment of national war 
debt, it was drafted to apply much more extensively. The Supreme Court defers to Congress on 
whether tax provisions promote general welfare. See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 
(1937) (“The line must still be drawn between one welfare and another, between particular and 
general. . . . The discretion, however, is not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to 
Congress . . . . ”).  
 117. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 180 (1996) (“[T]he [F]ramers believed that [the government’s] revenue needs would 
be met through a program of indirect taxation centering on import duties . . . .”).  
 118. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the 
Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195, 1205 (2012) (“The Founders understood that import duties would not 
only raise revenues, but would also change the behavior of those subject to them. Like raising 
revenues, stimulating domestic production of manufactured goods by reducing their importation was 
an important legislative purpose.”).  
 119. For numerous examples of tax provisions that reward and penalize behavior, see Mason, 
supra note 109, at 984–92. 
 120. Id. at 984 (“[All tax scholars] concede that the government uses the tax law not only to raise 
revenue, but also to influence taxpayer behavior.”).  
 121. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 136 (1973). The Office of Management and Budget defines tax expenditures as 
“alternatives to other policy instruments, such as spending.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013 247 (2012).  
 122. Mason, supra note 109, at 978.  
 123. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 391–
417 (1990) (discussing the shortcomings of the purposive approach to statutory interpretation). Judge 
Posner, for instance, has argued against such an approach on the grounds that statutes are the result of 
political compromise among competing interest groups, rather than implementations of public-
regarding purposes. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 288–90 (1985). 
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for a primary purpose particularly difficult. Although scholars widely 
agree on the existence of tax expenditures and tax penalties, deciding 
which provisions go in which category, or neither, has long proved vexing. 
This is because there is no scholarly consensus on the definition of the 
ideal base from which tax expenditures and penalties are said to deviate.
124
 
For instance, if one views the proper tax base as excluding income from 
savings (as would be the case under a cash-flow consumption tax), then 
the lower rates on capital gains would appear as tax penalties. If instead, 
one adopted the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income,
125
 income 
from savings would indeed be taxed and thus the preferential capital gains 
rates would appear as tax expenditures.
126
 If one’s baseline is the 
Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income with the omission of the 
classical corporate tax, then perhaps the capital gains rates simply offset 
our current system’s double taxation of corporate income and thus 
constitute neither tax penalties nor tax expenditures but are simply 
provisions that raise revenue.
127
  
In the taxing power context, Justice Cardozo expressed the view that 
policing the line between taxes and fines impermissibly required 
“psychoanalysis” of Congress by the judiciary,128 and the Court has 
subsequently reasoned that prudential considerations place “[i]nquiry into 
the hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power 
constitutionally conferred upon it” outside of the judiciary’s 
competency.
129
 Congressional members may not state the purpose of the 
tax provisions, they may all have mixed motives in pursuing them, or 
 
 
 124. Mason, supra note 109, at 984 (“Th[e] baseline problem is well understood, and so far, no 
satisfying solution has been advanced to solve it.”). The problem that defining the baseline poses for 
tax expenditure analysis was first and famously identified by Boris Bittker several decades ago, shortly 
after Stanley Surrey’s introduction of the concept. Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax 
Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 244, 247, 260 (1969). 
 125. This classical definition of income includes “consumption plus (or minus) the net increase (or 
decrease) in value of an individual’s assets during the taxable period.” Boris I. Bittker, A 
“Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 929 (1967). 
 126. Until 2004, the Treasury Department listed the preferential rate on capital gains as a tax 
expenditure every year since its budget was first prepared in 1972. Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, 
Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 1, 19 n.123 (2011). The Joint Committee on 
Taxation, however, continues to classify the preference as a tax expenditure. JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
TAXATION, JCS-1-13, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017 5, 
34 (2013). 
 127. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL YEAR 2004 138–39 (2003) (justifying the 
omission of capital gains from the list of tax expenditures on essentially these grounds). 
 128. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
 129. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1937). 
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different members may have different motives.
130
 As this discussion points 
out, however, the very characterization of a member’s motive lacks solid 
theoretical grounding since it depends on an ideal tax base, a concept that 
tax scholars have yet to come to an agreement upon despite four decades 
of effort.
131
 Asking the Court to resolve a debate that implicates the proper 
distribution of societal benefits and burdens is not only impractical but 
outside its competence.
132
  
Rather than searching for congressional purpose, the Court seems to 
have chosen an objective inquiry in defining the scope of the Origination 
Clause. The remainder of this Part discusses the Court’s interpretations of 
the Senate’s amendment power under the Clause and synthesizes them as 
further expressions of its reluctance to delve too deeply into the legislative 
process. I then continue this pattern to predict other expansive 
interpretations of the Senate’s power to amend revenue legislation.  
C. The Senate’s Power to Amend Revenue Legislation 
1. The Lack of a Germaneness Requirement 
As stated above, the text of the Origination Clause provides that “the 
Senate may propose or concur with Amendments [on bills for raising 
revenue] as on other Bills,”133 which raises several questions. Why does 
the text specify two paths to amend? What is meant by the language “as on 
other Bills”? Does the Senate’s amendment have to be germane to the 
House bill? Even if the Court generally does not enforce a germaneness 
requirement, does the shell bill tactic cross the line into 
unconstitutionality? Does the Senate have the freedom to turn a 
revenue-neutral or revenue-decreasing bill into a revenue-increasing one? 
Vice versa? The Court has only answered a minority of these questions, 
but its answers again shed light on its general approach to challenges 
 
 
 130. Mason, supra note 109, at 1026. 
 131. Caleb Nelson has traced the evolution of judicial review of legislative purpose over time, 
discussing how many traditional rationales for restriction of such review have fallen away in modern 
times. Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784 (2008). As 
discussed in the text, however, the tax context presents special and ongoing concerns regarding the 
judicial review of legislative purpose.  
 132. Ruth Mason has made a similar argument in the taxing power context, calling such a task 
“quintessentially legislative.” Mason, supra note 109, at 1026; see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Winn and 
the Inadvisability of Constitutionalizing Tax Expenditure Analysis, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25 (2011) 
(warning of the indeterminacy of the tax expenditure concept in importing it to the Establishment 
Clause context).  
 133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
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under the Origination Clause. As before, apprehension of its institutional 
limitations drives much of its analysis.  
The Court first attempted to construe the Senate’s amendment power in 
Flint v. Stone Tracy Company.
134
 In that case, the taxpayer challenged a 
tax enacted as part of the Tariff Act of 1909 as improperly originating in 
the Senate. The Senate had removed a section of the tariff bill adopting an 
inheritance tax and replaced it with a corporate tax.
135
 The Flint Court held 
that this fell within the Senate’s amendment power under the Clause.136 It 
examined the text of the Clause and concluded the following:  
The bill having properly originated in the House, we perceive no 
reason in the constitutional provision relied upon why it may not be 
amended in the Senate in the manner which it was in this case. The 
amendment was germane to the subject-matter of the bill, and not 
beyond the power of the Senate to propose.
137
  
Although the Court’s rationale makes mention of a germaneness 
requirement, the Court did not explain how a corporate tax could, in fact, 
be germane to an inheritance tax. Indeed, other than both producing 
revenue it is difficult to see a connection between the two.
138
 The Court 
has since expressed a reluctance to examine the relationship between the 
Senate’s amendment and the original House bill whose text it replaces. In 
Rainey v. United States, the Court upheld as constitutional the Senate’s 
addition of an excise tax on foreign-manufactured yachts to a tariff bill.
139
 
The Court adopted the lower court’s reasoning that it is outside the power 
of the judiciary “to determine whether the amendment was or was not 
outside the purposes of the original bill.”140 The Rainey holding, along 
with the absence of any relationship between the two taxes at issue in 
Flint, casts doubt upon the existence of a germaneness requirement.  
The Court’s mindfulness of its institutional limitations in Rainey, 
however, seems to stand in contrast to the Munoz-Flores holding, in which 
the Court was willing to put justiciability concerns aside in determining 
whether a bill had in fact originated in the house designated by Congress. 
 
 
 134. 220 U.S. 107 (1911). 
 135. Id. at 143. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Of course if revenues are sufficient to establish germaneness, the requirement is superfluous. 
Moreover, under House precedent, even if an amendment has the same fundamental purpose as the 
bill, it will be non-germane if it prescribes a sufficiently different method to achieve that purpose.  
 139. Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 317 (1914). 
 140. Id. 
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The two inquiries, however, are quite different. For one, it is rather 
straightforward for the Court to actually unearth where a bill began. 
Inquiry into whether an amendment is related to a bill, however, is a much 
more nettlesome endeavor.  
For instance, suppose the House passed a bill that eliminated the 
double taxation on corporate income (a reform referred to by tax experts as 
“corporate tax integration”) by excluding dividend income in the hands of 
shareholders. The Senate, however, amends this bill to instead raise rates 
on dividends, say from the current top rate of 20% so that they are taxed 
like ordinary income at a top rate of 39.6%. Effectively, the Senate has 
enacted a tax that lies contrary to the purpose motivating the House bill. 
Yet since it involves the taxation of dividends, is it germane to that bill? 
Or does germaneness require a relationship to corporate tax integration? 
The answer would depend upon the degree of germaneness required, 
which would necessarily entail policy judgments regarding the underlying 
legislation. The Court could use the legislature’s rich precedents regarding 
interpretation of germaneness requirements as a guide in such an 
inquiry,
141
 but to apply and interpret legislative rules is in tension with 
separation of powers concerns, as well as the Rulemaking Clause and the 
case law thereunder.
142
  
Additionally, if the Court enforced a germaneness requirement, 
Congress would be incentivized to legislate in an inefficient fashion. For 
instance, the House might separate omnibus bills into various 
single-subject bills such that the Senate would be less likely to meet the 
germaneness test.
143
 A germaneness requirement might also prevent the 
 
 
 141. Under the House germaneness requirement, it could be argued that even though the 
hypothetical Senate amendment relates to the general subject matter of the House bill, it is still not 
germane. See WILLIAM MCKAY & CHARLES W. JOHNSON, PARLIAMENT AND CONGRESS: 
REPRESENTATION AND SCRUTINY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 181 (2012) (stating that House 
germaneness procedure requires that an amendment not broaden the scope of the bill and that it must 
share the purpose, as well as the means to that purpose, of the underlying bill). 
 142. See supra text accompanying notes 65–66; see also infra notes 213; 215–19 and 
accompanying text. 
 143. There are benefits to the reduction of omnibus legislation, such as considered deliberation 
and the reduction of logrolling. See Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case 
for a Truth-in-Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957 (advocating a constitutional 
amendment that would limit bills to a single subject). That being said, the complexity of the federal 
lawmaking apparatus makes at least some packaging of legislation necessary from an efficiency 
standpoint.  
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passing of a bill, even though all that was required for the Senate’s 
approval was the addition of one unrelated, uncontroversial provision.
144
  
Additionally, the history of the Clause seems to militate against a 
germaneness requirement since the Framers specifically rejected a form of 
the Clause that would have prevented the Senate from amending a revenue 
bill in a manner that would “change the mode of levying [the tax].”145  
On the other hand, Madison’s warning that the Senate’s amendment 
power would become a “source of doubt and altercation” could be read to 
support the existence of a germaneness requirement: 
When an obnoxious paragraph shall be sent down from the Senate 
to the House of Representatives, it will be called an origination 
under the name of an amendment. The Senate may actually couch 
extraneous matter under that name. In these cases, the question will 
turn on the degree of connection between the matter and object of 
the bill, and the alteration or amendment offered to it. Can there be 
a more fruitful source of dispute, or a kind of dispute more difficult 
to be settled?
146
 
It is unclear, however, whether Madison was merely speculating as to the 
intra-congressional disputes that may arise, or instead saw the Senate’s 
amendment power as indeed cabined by germaneness. Since Madison was 
commenting on an earlier version of the Origination Clause, it is also 
uncertain whether the final version of the Clause obviated Madison’s 
concerns by clarifying that the Senate may amend revenue bills “as on 
other Bills.”  
What then does this phrase, “as on other Bills,” mean?147 One 
possibility is that the phrase is dynamic and ambulatory, evolving with 
Senate practice as to its general amendment power. This view would 
 
 
 144. In fact, Madison invoked an analogous hypothetical to support the Senate’s power to amend 
revenue legislation generally. 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 31, at 317; 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, 
supra note 36, at 376. Justice Story later made a similar point:  
 There would also be no small inconvenience in excluding the senate from the exercise of 
this power of amendment and alteration; since if any, the slightest modification were required 
in such a bill to make it either palatable or just, the senate would be compelled to reject it, 
although an amendment of a single line might make it entirely acceptable to both houses. 
STORY, supra note 22, at 317. 
 145. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 31, at 273. 
 146. 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 36, at 417. 
 147. This phrase was borrowed from the Massachusetts constitution. CHARLES WARREN, THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 669 (1928). However, there is no state case law interpreting it. See 
Medina, supra note 13, at 206–07 (detailing case law and stating that “[g]iven its long history, 
Massachusetts’ origination clause has received little construction”) (footnote omitted).  
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comport with the traditional understanding of each house of Congress 
having domain over its legislative rules.
148
 Jefferson’s Manual of 
Parliamentary Practice for the Use of the Senate of the United States 
suggests that the Senate’s general power to amend has traditionally been 
quite broad, long encompassing the shell bill tactic:  
Amendments may be made so as totally to alter the nature of the 
proposition; and it is a way of getting rid of a proposition, by 
making it bear a sense different from what was intended by the 
movers, so that they vote against it themselves. A new bill may be 
ingrafted by way of amendment on the words, “Be it enacted 
. . . .”149  
According to Jefferson, the lack of a germaneness requirement followed 
the practice of Parliament.
150
 Since its first meeting, the House 
affirmatively required amendments to be germane to the pending bill, yet 
House precedent also admits of the inherent ability of the legislature to 
propose a non-germane amendment, absent an express rule.
151
 Historically, 
the Senate has lacked a formal written rule against non-germane 
amendments on general legislation,
152
 and thus early congressional 
 
 
 148. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings 
. . . .”). 
 149. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE 
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES § 35.3 (1801) (citation omitted); see also P.H. MELL, A MANUAL OF 
PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE: RULES FOR CONDUCTING BUSINESS IN DELIBERATIVE ASSEMBLIES 60 
(1893) (characterizing substitute bills as amendments). 
 150. JEFFERSON, supra note 149, at § 35.3; see also MCKAY & JOHNSON, supra note 141, at 177 
(citing precedent that suggests the germaneness requirement did not exist in the House of Commons 
prior to 1883).  
 151. 5 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 5825 (1907) [hereinafter HINDS’ PRECEDENTS] (“In the absence of an express rule, 
the amendment would not be liable to a point of order upon the ground that it was inconsistent with or 
not germane to the subject under consideration, for, according to the common parliamentary law of 
this country and of England, a legislative assembly might by an amendment, in the ordinary form or in 
the form of a substitute, change the entire character of any bill or other proposition pending. It might 
entirely displace the original subject under consideration, and in its stead adopt one wholly foreign to 
it, both in form and in substance.”).  
 152. See FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS 
AND PRACTICES, S. DOC NO. 101-28, at 854 (1992) (“The Senate does not have a general rule requiring 
that amendments be germane to the measure to which they are proposed.”). Important exceptions to 
the lack of germaneness requirement in the Senate are upon invocation of cloture, during consideration 
of an appropriations or a budget reconciliation bill, and when proceeding under a unanimous consent 
agreement. See Pub. L. No. 93-944, 313, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codifying the reconciliation process); 
Rebecca M. Kysar, Reconciling Congress to Tax Reform, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2121, 2128 (2013) 
(discussing certain of these germaneness requirements); RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO 
101-28, at 1311 (detailing unanimous consent agreements); STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE: 
REVISED TO JAN. 24, 2013, S. DOC. NO 113-18, at 11–12 (Rule XVI: Appropriations and Amendments 
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practice and American understanding of parliamentary practice leaves 
room for omission of such a requirement.  
Since the Senate possesses the power to attach non-germane 
amendments to non-revenue bills, the Constitution thus appears to 
prescribe its power to do so in the context of revenue bills. Nonetheless, 
early congressional precedents on the issue are mixed. Shortly after 
ratification of the Constitution, the House passed a bill to establish a 
national tariff system, with the Senate making thirty-three amendments, 
many of which were non-germane.
153
 Several years later, however, the 
Senate’s ability to meaningfully alter revenue bills was called into 
question. In 1807, the House passed a bill protecting maritime commerce 
from pirates and also repealing duties on salt. The Senate responded with 
an amendment that would reduce the duty on salt rather than repeal it. 
Representative John Randolph objected to the amendment as falling 
outside its powers under the Origination Clause: 
[A] fair construction of [the Senate’s amendment power] will 
confine it to the details of the bill, and restrain them from affecting 
the leading principles; the quantum of tax or its objects. For if they 
possess the power of varying the objects or altering the quantum, 
the power reserved to this House is illusory.
154
 
Randolph thus argued for limiting the Senate’s amendment power to 
accepting the bill, rejecting the bill, or making minor changes as to its 
“details.” Although several other congressional members objected to this 
understanding, the House ultimately sustained the motion in support of 
Randolph’s view.155  
Throughout the nineteenth century, the debate over germaneness 
continued. The House generally took the position that such a requirement 
existed.
156
 At times, the Senate would appear to concede to the House’s 
view,
157
 but for the most part it disputed the existence of a germaneness 
 
 
to General Appropriations Bills (prescribing procedures for appropriations bills)); STANDING RULES 
OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO 113-18, at 15–17 (Rule XXII: Precedence of Motions (prescribing 
procedures upon invocation of cloture)). 
 153. Michael Evans, The Foundations of the Tax Legislation Process: The Confederation, 
Constitutional Convention, and First Revenue Law, TAX NOTES, Jan. 21, 1991, at 291–93. 
 154. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 630 (1807). 
 155. Id. at 635–36. 
 156. 2 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 151, §§ 1481, 1489 (1907).  
 157. In arguing for the Senate’s ability to amend a House bill repealing duties on tea and coffee to 
one which imposed import duties, Senator Ritchie contended the following:  
 [T]here is no limitation of this power of propositions and concurrence, an amendment 
carries with it all the rights and privileges of parliamentary construction. It is those 
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requirement, arguing that the requirement would deny to the Senate the 
power to make “anything more than mere formal amendments.”158  
After the Civil War, the dispute over the Senate’s amendment power 
came to a head. In 1872, the House passed a thirty-two-word bill repealing 
duties on tea and coffee, which the Senate replaced with a twenty-page 
amendment repealing the entire income tax (which had been enacted to 
finance the war) and modifying the tariff system.
159
 The House protested 
this move, with one representative arguing that the Framers intended a 
germaneness requirement such that only “amendments touching the 
subject upon which revenue was to be raised as in their judgment should 
be deemed wise and proper; either to raise or lower the rate, to modify the 
time or mode of collection, or anything pertaining immediately to that 
subject-matter.”160 Another member disputed whether the substitution of a 
“great thick bill” actually constituted an amendment,161 and a House 
majority agreed, passing a resolution informing the Senate of its 
constitutional violation.
162
 
In response to the House resolution, the Senate Committee on 
Privileges and Elections filed a report forcefully discussing the Senate’s 
power to amend. The report reasoned that the power to amend was broad 
since the Framers consciously deviated from the practice in British 
Parliament, in which the House of Lords had no such power at all.
163
 The 
report also emphasized the phrase “as on other Bills” as an express and 
plain directive that the amendment power is unlimited.
164
 Under the 
Senate’s view, the only limitation upon its power was that it could not 
 
 
amendments that parliamentary usages and law permit only that can be added. The question, 
to my apprehension, is whether the Senate has proposed an amendment which in 
parliamentary law would be germane to the subject. 
 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 2111 (1873). 
 158. S. REP. NO. 42–146, at 4 (1872), discussed in 2 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS supra note 151, § 1489 
(1907).  
 159. Evans, supra note 13. 
 160. CONG. GLOBE 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 2106 (1872). 
 161. Id.; see also id. at 2107 (Representative James A. Garfield stating, “I do not deny [the 
Senate’s] right to send back a bill of a thousand pages as an amendment to our two lines. But I do 
insist that their thousand pages must be on the subject-matter of our bill.”). 
 162. Id. at 2111–12. 
 163. S. REPT. NO. 42–146, at 3, discussed in 2 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS supra note 151, § 1489.  
 164. Id. (“Your committee[s] are at a loss to know how this matter can be made plainer than the 
express words of the Constitution make it. The provision in relation to such bills that ‘the Senate may 
propose or concur with amendments as on other bills,’ declares this power of the Senate as clearly as 
language can declare it. The Constitution does not prescribe what amendments, or limit the extent of 
the amendments which the Senate may propose; and the House of Representatives cannot regulate or 
limit a power which the Constitution has, in express words, so broadly conferred upon the Senate.”). 
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propose a revenue-related amendment on a House bill that was not itself 
revenue-related.
165
  
The issue was ultimately left unresolved since the expiration of the 
income tax at issue rendered moot the Senate’s expedited repeal of it. 
Ultimately, however, both Houses came to recognize a broad Senate 
power to amend revenue bills. For instance, in 1879, the House passed a 
bill modifying domestic taxation that the Senate attempted to amend to 
raise import duties. In response to a Senate point of order against its ability 
to do so, a Senator argued that the right to amend was “limited only by 
[the Senate’s] own rules.”166 The Senate rejected the point of order, thus 
also rejecting any germaneness requirement on its amendment power.
167
 
Over the next several decades, the House gradually abandoned its 
restrictive view of the Senate’s amendment power.168 In fact, in 1909, no 
member of the House challenged the Senate’s conversion of the House 
tariff bill into a new tax on corporate income, at issue in Flint. In 1968, the 
House voted to table a resolution to blue-slip a significant Senate 
amendment enacting an emergency wartime surtax to a minor House 
revenue bill extending excise taxes,
169
 and in 1982, the House again 
confirmed a broad reading of the amendment power in tabling a blue-slip 
resolution on a Senate amendment that replaced a minor tax cut initiated in 
the House with a bill increasing taxes by nearly $100 billion.
170
 
To summarize, evidence on the original meaning of the amendment 
power disfavors the existence of a germaneness requirement, as does the 
text of the Clause. Although the matter remained unsettled between the 
two Houses for some time, the Court has decided not to enforce any such 
requirement. Its refusal to do so further assembles the Origination Clause 
jurisprudence within a larger legislative process avoidance doctrine. As 
discussed below, the power given to Congress over the legislative process 
 
 
 165. Id.  
 166. 8 CONG. REC. 1478 (1879).  
 167. Id. at 1482. 
 168. See Evans, supra note 13 (discussing an 1883 precedent in which the House left the 
germaneness question to be resolved in conference and an 1888 precedent in which the House rejected 
a resolution blue-slipping a Senate amendment). 
 169. 114 CONG. REC. 17977 (1968). 
 170. 128 CONG. REC. 18375–76 (1982). The precedential value of the House’s act may not bind it 
in the future since it did not formally concede the point. See Evans, supra note 13. A report by the 
Congressional Research Service, however, concludes that recent congressional precedents “exhibit no 
general restriction on the Senate’s amendment authority.” SATURNO, supra note 64, at 6. Since the 
Senate has no internal rule requiring amendments to be germane, it may essentially “‘originate’ 
specific tax provisions, even though it may not originate tax measures.” Id. 
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through the Rulemaking Clause, as well as theories of judicial review, may 
mandate such an approach.
171
  
2. The Constitutionality of Shell Bills 
Judicial enforcement of a general germaneness requirement for Senate 
amendments implicates institutional concerns; however, a rule that 
recognizes the Senate’s complete substitution of a House bill as prima 
facie evidence of non-germaneness appears straightforward. Under this 
view, the Court would strike down only wholesale amendments to shell 
bills for failing the germaneness test and would thus be relieved of having 
to make a searching inquiry into the legislative record or otherwise 
exceeding its judicial function. This more modest approach, however, 
would also prove unworkable in practice and would violate the legislative 
process avoidance doctrine. 
Although the Court has never confronted the issue, several state and 
lower federal courts have condoned the shell bill game and none have 
prohibited it.
172
 Pursuers of original meaning, however, might consult 
dictionaries contemporary with the Founding era to justify departure from 
existing case law. Johnson’s Dictionary, for instance, defines “amend” to 
mean “to correct; to change any thing that is wrong.”173 It defines 
“amendment” as “a change from bad for the better,” specifically “[i]n law, 
the correction of an errour committed in a process.”174 These definitions 
seem to require something narrower than a wholesale substitution. One 
 
 
 171. See infra Part III.A.I–B. 
 172. Walthall v. United States, 131 F.3d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding the Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act, which began as a shell bill, against an Origination Clause challenge); 
Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1985) (same); Tex. Assoc. of Concerned 
Taxpayers, Inc. v. United States, 772 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); Wardell v. United States, 
757 F.2d 203, 205 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (same); Rowe v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 1516, 
1519 (D. Del. 1984), aff’d, 749 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); Heitman v. United States, 753 F.2d 33, 
35 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (same); Tibbetts v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 577 F. Supp. 911, 914 
(W.D.N.C. 1984) (same); Frent v. United States, 571 F. Supp. 739, 742 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (same, 
noting that “[n]othing in the [Origination] clause indicates that the Senate may not amend a revenue 
raising bill by a wholesale substitution of the text of that bill”); Stamp v. Comm’r, 579 F. Supp. 168, 
171 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (same, reasoning that “hoary doctrine permits . . . wholesale amendment so long 
as the Senate version is relevant to the subject matter of the original House version,” presumably 
interpreting relevancy broadly); Milazzo v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 248, 252–53 (S.D. Cal. 1984) 
(same, reasoning that the bill “remained a revenue bill” although it was “dramatically altered”); 
Bearden v. Comm’r, 575 F. Supp. 1459, 1460–61 (D. Utah 1983) (same); see also Shadrick v. 
Bledsoe, 186 Ga. 345 (1938) (interpreting similar language under the Georgia constitution in holding 
that a substitute bill is a recognized method of amendment under parliamentary procedure). 
 173. 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1768).  
 174. Id.  
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could further argue that the phrase “as on other Bills” forecloses substitute 
amendments since it was not expected that the Senate would employ such 
a technique. Moreover, the preposition “on,” which Johnson’s Dictionary 
defines as “noting addition or accumulation” and “noting dependence or 
reliance,” would suggest that an amendment must be attached to a bill.175 
Since there is essentially nothing left of the original bill in the shell bill 
tactic, aside from its number, one could argue that the substitute 
amendment is not attached on a bill, within the meaning of the Clause’s 
text.
176
 
The “as on other Bills” phrasing in the Clause, however, invites 
Congress to supply its own interpretation of the amendment power that 
changes over time.
177
 Even if the Framers did not expect the Senate’s 
amendment power to include substitute amendments, the Framers would 
not have chosen to foreclose the Senate’s ability to employ them. This 
understanding also comports with the Rulemaking Clause of the 
Constitution, which gives each house authority over its own 
proceedings.
178
 
 In fact, it seems not lost upon the drafters that the Senate’s amendment 
power would lead to the shell bill tactic, thus reducing the protection 
afforded the large states by the Origination Clause. In 1788, William 
Grayson (a delegate to the Convention but eventual opponent of the 
Constitution) stated at the Virginia State Convention that “the power of 
proposing amendments [is] the same, in effect, as that of originating” since 
“[t]he Senate could strike out every word of the bill, except the word 
whereas, or any other introductory word, and might substitute new words 
of their own.”179  
One might still argue, however, that the Senate’s ability “to propose or 
concur with Amendments” forecloses shell bills since such bills cannot be 
construed as “concurrence” with the House. Granted, the Senate could 
“propose” amendments as an alternative to “concurrence,” however, this is 
a separate path. Accordingly, the text could be read as requiring that any 
 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Daniel Smyth, The Origination Clause: Die Harder, Obamacare!, AM. THINKER (Oct. 
19, 2012), http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/10/the_origination_clause_die_harder_obamacare 
.html. 
 177. This is analogous to Jack Balkin’s distinction between original meaning and original 
expected application. Balkin embraces the former since constitutional text often is intentionally vague, 
allowing future generations to discern its applications. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original 
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007). Here, I argue that the Framers left the text ambiguous for 
both present and future Congresses to interpret. 
 178. This point is elaborated below. See infra Part III.A. 
 179. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 377. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
692 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:659 
 
 
 
 
such amendments proposed by the Senate must then be returned to it after 
a House vote approving the amendments (at which point the Senate finally 
“concurs”). Otherwise, why would it be necessary for the two routes—
propose or concur—to be set forth in the text when the latter renders the 
former superfluous?  
There is, however, an additional explanation of why the two paths 
exist. Mike Rappaport suggests that the language was drafted to reflect the 
fact that the Senate has either the right to make suggestions to the House 
falling short of a formal vote or to pass the bill with amendments. Under 
this understanding, the meaning of the word “concur” may simply refer to 
the Senate “passing an amended bill as opposed to proposing one without 
passing it.”180 Indeed, there was some question in the colonies as to the 
proper amount of policymaking the Senate could engage in before the 
House revenue bill was presented to it.
181
 Rappaport’s explanation is thus 
plausible given the necessity to clarify an informal role for the Senate in 
formulating revenue policy. 
The constitutional text thus seems to leave the delineation of the 
Senate’s amendment power to Congress, and from a constitutional 
perspective, its blessing of shell bills seems reasonable. The Court’s own 
institutional limitations should lead it to uphold shell bills since an 
opposite conclusion would prove unworkable. The Senate, for example, 
might replace a revenue bill with an amendment whose aim is identical, 
but whose technical approach is entirely different. To take the above 
example, suppose the House again attempts to integrate the corporate tax 
through dividend exclusion. The Senate also supports integration of the 
corporate tax, but completely replaces the text of the House bill with a 
form of integration that repeals the income tax at the corporate level while 
maintaining taxation of dividends at the shareholder level.
182
 Since the 
Senate’s approach achieves the House’s goal of corporate tax integration, 
 
 
 180. Mike Rappaport, Obamacare and the Origination Clause III: Propose or Concur with 
Amendments, LIBERTY LAW BLOG (OCT. 1, 2012) (emphasis in original), http://www.liberty 
lawsite.org/2012/10/01/obamacare-and-the-origination-clause-iii-propose-or-concur-with-amendments 
bout-the-original-language/. 
 181. See Evans, supra note 13 (discussing the extent to which the Senate could informally 
consider revenue bills as an open question even as of the 1800s). The doctrinal approach prescribed in 
this Article would support the constitutionality of the current practice whereby Senators can first 
introduce revenue measures and consider them informally so long as they are not formally passed and 
sent to the House. A contrary interpretation would cause the judiciary to conduct a searching inquiry 
into the legislative process.  
 182. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT ON INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND 
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992) [hereinafter TREASURY DEP’T] 
(detailing several methods of achieving corporate tax integration). 
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albeit through a different route, it could be argued that the substitute bill is 
germane to the shell bill. At the same time, the two approaches to 
integration result in very different consequences, and thus there is also an 
argument in favor of non-germaneness.
183
 Yet any non-germaneness 
between the two proposals has little to do with the fact that the Senate 
employed a shell bill tactic. 
To take an even starker example, suppose the House exempts dividends 
by passing the following bill: 
“H.R. 1. A Bill to Integrate the Corporate Tax. 
All distributions out of the earnings and profits of a corporation 
shall not be included in the gross income of equity holders.”184 
Further assume that the Senate strikes the text of the above bill and 
amends it to the following: 
“H.R. 1. A Bill to Integrate the Corporate Tax. 
All dividends shall be excluded from the gross income of 
shareholders.” 
Although the Senate’s amendment has completely replaced the text of the 
House bill, as any tax expert would know, the difference is merely in 
semantics rather than substance. The Court’s rejection of a Senate 
amendment that merely simplifies the House’s language would be overly 
formalistic. As a result, our quest to narrow the germaneness requirement 
to a bright line rule prohibiting shell bills has failed as too broad.  
A constitutional ban on shell bills may also be under-inclusive from the 
perspective of an advocate for a narrow amendment power. Suppose that 
the House passes a revenue bill with one hundred provisions—a provision 
increasing the penalty for failure to file partnership tax returns by .0001%, 
as well as ninety-nine provisions implementing the integration of the 
corporate tax. Suppose further that the Senate retains the penalty increase 
provision, strikes out those ninety-nine provisions relating to corporate tax 
 
 
 183. See, e.g., Michael L. Schler, Taxing Corporate Income Once (Or Hopefully Not at All): A 
Practitioner’s Comparison of the Treasury and ALI Integration Models, 47 TAX L. REV. 509, 512 
(1992) (discussing the similarity in the end result of the two approaches as well as the divergence in 
their “collateral consequences”). Under House precedent, an amendment that prescribes a sufficiently 
different method to achieve the same fundamental purpose as the underlying bill will be considered 
non-germane. MCKAY & JOHNSON, supra note 141, at 181. 
 184. As any tax expert will realize, this example is an over-simplification of how the dividend 
exclusion proposal would actually work. A more realistic example, for instance, would provide that 
dividends be excluded only to the extent the corporation has paid corporate-level income taxes, among 
other complex features. See TREASURY DEP’T, supra note 182, at 17. 
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integration, and replaces them with ninety-nine provisions creating an 
inheritance tax. The Senate’s retention of that one, very insignificant 
revenue provision absolves it from a shell bill violation. To reach a 
different result would require inquiry into the germaneness of the 
amendment, the very analysis we were trying to avoid with the blanket 
prohibition on shell bills.  
Taken together, these examples illustrate that a prohibition on shell 
bills is problematic. Just like in our discussion of a general germaneness 
requirement, judicial analysis of the legislative process produces deep 
impracticalities.  
3. Amendments Can Alter a Bill’s Revenue Effects 
Even if the Senate’s amendment power does not prohibit non-germane 
amendments or shell bills, other possible limitations exist that reduce the 
effectiveness of the shell bill game. For instance, can the Senate amend a 
House bill reducing revenues in such a way that the bill now increases 
revenues? In this section, I discuss why the jurisprudential pattern under 
the Origination Clause means that the Court would likely interpret “bills 
for raising revenue” as encompassing not only House bills that increase 
revenue, but also those that merely relate to revenues. Similarly, the 
Senate’s amendment power should not be construed as limited by the 
amendment’s revenue effects. 
This issue arose in the courts in the early 1980s when taxpayers 
challenged the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 
(“TEFRA”).185 TEFRA originated in the House of Representatives as a bill 
that would reduce revenues by $976 million over five years.
186
 Using a 
shell bill tactic, the Senate struck nearly all of the bill’s text and 
substituted provisions that increased revenues in the amount of $99 billion 
over three years.
187
 In the leading TEFRA case, Armstrong v. United 
States,
188
 a taxpayer sought a refund of taxes assessed under TEFRA, 
arguing that the Origination Clause only applied to bills that increase 
revenues. Accordingly, under the taxpayer’s view, TEFRA did not raise 
 
 
 185. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).  
 186. See Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 553 F. Supp. 267, 269 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 
733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (recounting the legislative history of TEFRA). 
 187. Id. After TEFRA passed the Senate, a constitutional debate ensued over the Senate’s actions. 
Ultimately, the House voted down resolutions that asserted the House’s prerogative to originate 
revenue legislation. Id.  
 188. 759 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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revenues until the Senate transformed it into a tax increase, in violation of 
the Clause.  
The Ninth Circuit rejected the taxpayer’s interpretation of the 
Origination Clause, holding instead that it applied to all bills “relating to 
taxes.”189 The Armstrong court cited Black’s Law Dictionary, the Framers’ 
intent, and congressional practice for this interpretation, noting that the 
Senate has never attempted to initiate tax decreases, a practice that the 
taxpayer’s interpretation would condone.190  
The court also reasoned that the taxpayer’s approach presented 
practical difficulties since a revenue bill may, in some years, increase 
revenues, and, in others decrease them. According to the court, 
Congressional members might also disagree as to the bill’s revenue 
effects.
191
 The court further concluded that the taxpayer’s interpretation 
would impermissibly narrow the amendment power since that power 
should not be read as constraining the Senate from altering revenues.
192
 
Finally, the Armstong court stated that its decision “is strongly influenced, 
if not controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Flint v. Stone Tracy 
Co.,”193 since the Supreme Court in that case was not troubled by the fact 
that the Senate amendment at issue increased taxes for corporations or 
raised revenues to a greater extent proposed in the original House bill.
194
 
In holding that the Origination Clause encompasses all revenue-related 
bills and that the TEFRA amendment was within the Senate’s power, the 
Armstrong court joined the view held by four other circuit courts and 
numerous district courts.
195
 
The TEFRA decisions conform to congressional precedent. For 
instance, in the post-Civil War example discussed above,
196
 the House 
initially argued that a Senate bill repealing the income tax was a bill for 
“raising revenue.” Later, the Senate would concede the point in arguing 
that a House bill repealing duties on tea and coffee was also a bill for 
“raising revenue,” therefore it was free to amend that bill by substituting a 
repeal of the income tax.
197
 At the time of the debates surrounding 
 
 
 189. Id. at 1381 (emphasis in original). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 1382. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See supra text accompanying note 172 (footnote 172 lists cases involving TEFRA). 
 196. See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying notes 
163–65. 
 197. See Evans, supra note 13; 2 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 151, § 1489 (1907) (“Suppose 
the existing law lays a duty of 50 per cent upon iron. A bill repealing such law, and providing that after 
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TEFRA, some House members expressed the view that the 
House-originated, revenue-reducing bill did not fall within the ambit of the 
Origination Clause.
198
 Nonetheless, the House eventually acquiesced.
199
 In 
more recent precedent, the House has actively protected its constitutional 
prerogative in originating revenue-decreasing bills.
200
  
It could also be argued that even if a revenue-neutral or 
revenue- decreasing shell bill is a revenue bill for purposes of the 
Origination Clause, the Senate could be forbidden from tacking on 
additional revenues. The textual basis for such an argument would be that 
the Clause’s phrase “as on other Bills” limits the Senate from increasing 
revenues since they cannot do so upon non-revenue bills.
201
 However, the 
history of the Clause, in which the Framers rejected a version that would 
have prevented the Senate amending a revenue bill in a manner that would 
“increase or diminish the sum to be raised,” does not support such a 
limitation of the Senate’s amendment power.202 Additionally, the Senate 
likely cannot amend a non-revenue bill to decrease revenues, as discussed 
above, so to interpret the phrase “as on other Bills” in this manner would 
prevent the Senate from amending a revenue bill to lower taxes. This 
would stand in tension with the Clause’s enactment history since Madison 
explicitly rejected the aforementioned version of the Clause since it would 
prevent the Senate from diminishing revenues.
203
 Instead, as I argue 
throughout this Article, the phrase “as on other Bills” is best read as a 
delegation to the Senate for outlining the rules and procedures in which it 
is to amend revenue bills.  
Given the institutional limitations facing the Court in ascertaining the 
level of revenues anticipated to be produced by a bill, it is likely the Court 
would follow Armstrong in interpreting “revenue-raising” to mean 
 
 
a certain day the duty upon iron shall be only 40 per cent, is still a bill for raising revenue, because that 
is the end in contemplation. Less revenue will be raised than under the former law, still it is intended to 
raise revenue, and such a bill could not constitutionally originate in the Senate, nor could such 
provisions be ingrafted, by way of amendment, in the Senate upon any House bill which did not 
provide for raising—that is, collecting—revenue.”) (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 146 
(1872)). 
 198. 128 CONG. REC. H6357, H6366 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1982) (statement of Rep. Moore) (“The 
bill, H.R. 4961, when it left the House did not raise revenue. As a matter of fact, all six of its minor 
provisions lost revenue. The other body in violation of the Constitution struck all of these provisions 
and replaced them with a massive revenue-raising bill.”). 
 199. See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying notes 163–65. 
 200. See 144 CONG. REC. H878-79 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1998) (returning to the Senate a bill 
repealing a fee that was determined by the House to have a direct, negative impact on revenues). 
 201. Thanks to Andrew Hyman for raising this argument. 
 202. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 31, at 273. 
 203. See PRESCOTT, supra note 37, at 444. 
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“revenue-relating,” in keeping with the legislative process avoidance 
doctrine. It is also likely that the Court would reject a prohibition on the 
Senate increasing revenues through amendment for the same reasons. 
Although the Court could defer to the revenue estimates of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (JCT) prepared at the time of the bill’s 
consideration, sometimes the JCT does not prepare such estimates if the 
bill lacks momentum in Congress, as was the case for the shell bill used to 
enact the Affordable Care Act. Moreover, although the JCT has 
maintained its reputation as a non-partisan body, congressional members 
do not always agree with its analysis. For instance, the JCT chooses to 
ignore certain macroeconomic effects for budget reporting purposes, an 
omission which at times has proven controversial.
204
 To address this 
omission, a House rule has required the JCT to provide a separate 
“macroeconomic impact analysis” of bills reported by the Ways and 
Means Committee.
205
 An issue could thus arise as to which estimate the 
Court should rely upon. Adding to the complexity, the revenue estimates 
are sometimes updated in connection with constructing the new CBO 
baseline, and the Court may have to decide between the estimate upon 
which Congress relied and the more recent one.  
More troublingly, in a world of expiring tax legislation, there is 
considerable disagreement as to the appropriate baseline to be used in 
revenue estimates. For instance, the recent extension of the Bush tax cuts 
for the middle class would have been scored as a revenue-raiser if the 
baseline incorporated purported “current policy” (i.e., extension of all 
Bush tax cuts), but would have been scored as a revenue-loser if the 
baseline incorporated current law (i.e., expiration of the tax cuts as 
scheduled). Finally, revenue estimates provided by the JCT cover only up 
to a ten-year budget window period.
206
 Legislation producing a short-term 
revenue decrease may actually increase revenues on a long-term horizon, 
and vice versa. Deciding among the various possible revenue estimates 
would thus force the Court into the position of budgetary scorekeeper.  
Construing the Origination Clause to apply to measures affecting, 
rather than only increasing, revenues also seems to comport with the 
purpose of the Clause. A tax bill that decreases revenues may be 
 
 
 204. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC MODELS AND ESTIMATING 
PRACTICES OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-46-11, at 2–3 (2011), available at 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4359. 
 205. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TESTIMONY OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION 
BEFORE THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS REGARDING ECONOMIC MODELING, JCX-48-11, at 
3–4 (2011), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html ?func=startdown&id=4362. 
 206. See Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 15, at 1012 n.13 and accompanying text. 
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burdensome or unfair since it may be alleviating, to an insufficient degree, 
an already burdensome or unfair law. Additionally, the tendency of the 
legislature to deliver special interest legislation in the form of tax 
decreases implicates the interest of the people since those tax breaks may 
lead to higher general taxes to make up for the foregone revenue.
207
 
The likely conclusion that the Origination Clause encompasses all bills 
relating to revenue means that the Senate may alter a revenue-decreasing 
bill to one that increases revenues without violating the Origination 
Clause. This is a corollary to my conclusion above that no germaneness 
requirement cabins Senate amendments on revenue bills and is further 
supported by the same prudential considerations that weigh against 
limiting the Clause to revenue-increasing bills in the first place.  
III. THE THEORETICAL CASE FOR A LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AVOIDANCE 
DOCTRINE UNDER THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE 
I have argued above that the Court’s jurisprudence under the 
Origination Clause can largely be explained as an expression of its 
reluctance to conduct a searching review of the legislative process, thus 
predicting an expansive reading of the Senate’s amendment power. I have 
also defended this reading from the standpoint of constitutional history, 
text, and precedent, both judicial and congressional. Separation of powers 
principles support the Court’s approach to interpreting the Origination 
Clause and can be articulated as a legislative process avoidance doctrine, 
with possible application to other areas of constitutional law.  
The legislative process avoidance doctrine counsels that courts should 
construe ambiguous constitutional provisions in a manner that avoids 
searching review of the legislative process. For instance, where the 
Constitution does not clearly prescribe conditions for legislative 
enactment, the judiciary should be hesitant to interpret additional ones. 
The case for doing so appears especially strong in the matter at hand since 
the Origination Clause is closely associated with congressional procedure 
and gives the amendment power to the Senate “as on other Bills,” thus 
leaving the interpretative task to Congress.
208
 Whether the case for the 
legislative process avoidance doctrine is as strong in other areas of 
 
 
 207. See Kysar, supra note 1 (describing our tax system as a zero-sum game). 
 208. The question may arise as to which house gets to determine the scope of its amendment 
power. Logically, this should flow to the Senate since, in other contexts, it is the sole determiner of its 
power to amend. In modern times, both houses agree on an expansive interpretation of the Senate’s 
amendment power and therefore little turns on the answer to this question. 
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constitutional law is a subject for future inquiry. As a preliminary matter, 
questions left open by Article I, Section 7, such as the precise 
requirements of whether a bill “passes” a house or whether a house could 
delegate to a committee the power to present a passed bill to the President, 
are likely candidates for the doctrine’s application.209 As explained in this 
Part, separation of powers concerns, as embodied in the Rulemaking 
Clause and the political question doctrine, can be marshaled to support a 
legislative process avoidance doctrine, at least where the text indicates 
interpretive delegation to Congress. In areas of traditional legislative 
concern, ambiguity may even imply such delegation. 
A. The Rulemaking Clause and its Underpinnings 
Madison rightly predicted that the Origination Clause would be “a 
source of frequent [and] obstinate altercations,”210 yet the Framers did 
little to resolve its ambiguities. Did they wish Congress or the judiciary to 
settle disputes under the Clause? In warning that the Clause would become 
“a source of perpetual contentions” between the houses, James Wilson in 
fact assumed that there would be “no mediator to decide [such 
contentions].”211 After all, at the time of the Federal Constitutional 
Convention, the legitimacy of judicial review, as a general matter, was 
unsettled.
212
 It is likely that the judicial review of the internal workings of 
the legislature would have proven even more controversial, given the 
legislative prerogative over its internal proceedings. 
1. An Expansive Interpretation of the Rulemaking Clause 
The principle that the legislature has unfettered discretion over the 
lawmaking process has its textual roots in the Rulemaking Clause of the 
Constitution, and its historical roots in British and American law dating 
back centuries.
213
 Under the Rulemaking Clause, which provides that 
“[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,”214 the houses 
are free to make, amend, repeal, suspend, ignore, or waive their internal 
 
 
 209. The latter question was decided in favor of congressional deference in Mester Mfg. Co. v. 
INS, 879 F.2d 561, 570–71 (9th Cir. 1989).  
 210. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 41, at 238. 
 211. Id. at 444. 
 212. William E. Nelson, Commentary, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution 
of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790–1860, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1166, 1168 (1972).  
 213. John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional: Radical Textualism, 
Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 528 (2001). 
 214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.  
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rules.
215
 The Clause was adopted without discussion, reflecting the view, 
expressed by Justice Story, that the power over legislative rules is inherent 
in Congress’s lawmaking authority: 
No person can doubt the propriety of the provision authorizing each 
house to determine the rules of its own proceedings. If the power 
did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact the 
business of the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, 
deliberation, and order. The humblest assembly of men is 
understood to possess this power; and it would be absurd to deprive 
the councils of the nation of a like authority.
216
 
So fundamental is this legislative power that it could be argued that the 
Rulemaking Clause is superfluous; it merely confirms generally accepted 
separation of powers principles.
217
 It is often noted that procedure 
determines outcomes in the legislative process. If the judiciary could 
meddle with legislative procedure, it would essentially alter the statutory 
law, a troublesome result.  
Some trace the legislature’s unfettered discretion over its internal 
processes to the British theory of legislative sovereignty, which attempted 
to counter the long history of monarchical interference.
218
 It makes sense 
to question, then, whether this legislative prerogative should endure given 
the American break from the British theory in favor of sovereignty of the 
people.
219
 In other words, as a matter of constitutional design, were the 
Framers justified in giving to Congress the power over its internal 
proceedings?  
In many respects, the Constitution imposes limitations on the 
formulation of Congress’s internal rules. For instance, Sections 4 and 5 of 
Article I include rules for legislative assembly, selection of officers, 
 
 
 215. Roberts, supra note 213, at 525; see also Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 15, at 1021–
25 (discussing endogeneity of legislative rules in the budgetary context).  
 216. 2 STORY, supra note 22, at 298. 
 217. See Roberts, supra note 213, at 528 (discussing the lack of such a clause in the Articles of 
Confederation and the legislative body’s creation of legislative rules nonetheless). 
 218. Stephen Raher, Judicial Review of Legislative Procedure: Determining Who Determines the 
Rules of Proceedings 36 (Aug. 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the Midwest Political 
Science Association Spring Conference, 2009), available at http://works.bepress.com/stephen_raher/1. 
 219. See Nelson, supra note 212, at 1170–71 (“Americans rejected the traditional British view that 
the legislature possessed complete sovereignty and argued instead that sovereignty lay with the people, 
who by a constitution delegated limited power to the legislature. Legislators were mere ‘servants of the 
people,’ and a constitution, ‘the commission from whence [they] . . . derive[d] their power.’”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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discipline of members, and voting and quorum rules, among others.
220
 
These limitations thus represent the American rejection of the British 
tradition of legislative sovereignty. Accordingly, under the principles of 
judicial review established by Marbury v. Madison,
221
 the judiciary may 
properly enforce them.
222
 Nonetheless, where the people have not adopted 
constitutional provisions concerning legislative procedure, the judiciary’s 
involvement in the workings of legislative process is problematic.  
Indeed, the Constitution leaves ample room for Congress to supply 
certain details of the lawmaking process. Article 1, Section 7 says little 
about the actual process of creating legislation, focusing instead on the 
Presidential veto and override process. For instance, there is no 
requirement that an identical bill be passed by the two houses; instead the 
houses are left to their own devices in designing a method of agreeing 
upon the bill that is to be sent to the President.
223
 The manner of passage is 
also left vague. Accordingly, under current legislative rules, only one 
member of the majority need be present for a bill to pass, and there is no 
constitutional requirement that legislators read the text of a bill or have a 
factual basis for its contents.
224
 To be sure, the Court has emphasized that 
the “finely wrought and exhaustively considered” enactment process of 
Article I, Section 7 cannot be circumvented,
225
 but that apparatus leaves 
many gaps to be filled in by Congress under its rulemaking authority. 
 
 
 220. See Vermeule, supra note 21, at 361 (cataloguing the constitutional provisions that govern 
congressional procedure). 
 221. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 222. Id. at 176–78 (reasoning that the judiciary’s enforcement of unconstitutional laws “would 
subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions”).  
 223. Roberts, supra note 213, at 523–24. 
 224. Id. at 524. There are limited contexts in which the legislature must build a record when it 
passes a law. For instance, in assessing Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, the Court has 
reviewed the legislative record to determine if the empirical findings were sufficient to justify the 
contested legislation. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990 and referring to Congress’s failure to make sufficient findings that would 
justify the regulation of guns); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) 
(invalidating Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act as exceeding Congress’s powers under the 
Equal Protection Clause since the legislative record failed to show a pattern of irrational state 
discrimination against the disabled); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down 
federal legislation punishing violence against women in spite of congressional findings regarding the 
impact of gender-motivated violence on victims and families). These decisions have been heavily 
criticized. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, 
and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707 (2002) (contending that 
the Court has placed unrealistic obligations upon Congress and has failed to understand that majority 
vote, rather than deliberation, often dictate political outcomes); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, 
Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 83 (2001) (arguing that the Court’s approach constitutes 
encroachment upon Congress’s lawmaking powers). There is, however, no general rationality 
requirement for lawmaking. Roberts, supra note 213, at 524 n.88. 
 225. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (invalidating one-house legislative veto); Clinton v. 
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Additionally, the Court has interpreted the Rulemaking Clause broadly, 
affording Congress great flexibility over the legislative process. For 
instance, in United States v. Ballin, the Court deferred to the House’s 
interpretation of the constitutional “Quorum to do Business” requirement 
to include both voting and non-voting members, reasoning that the 
Rulemaking Clause of the Constitution empowers each house to create its 
legislative rules. According to the Ballin Court, the Rulemaking Clause 
preempts judicial review of such rules.
226
 The Ballin Court reasoned: “The 
power to make rules . . . is a continuous power, always subject to be 
exercised by the house, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and 
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.”227 
Other Supreme Court and lower federal cases adopt an expansive view 
of the Clause, seldom reviewing rules and capitulating to Congress unless 
the rule infringes upon constitutional limitations
228
 or the fundamental 
rights of individuals (especially when Congress functions in a 
semi-judicial capacity).
229
 A more recent case indicates the Court’s 
hesitance to review legislative rules even when they implicate individual 
rights. In Nixon v. United States, the Court held non-justiciable a Senate 
rule that delegated fact-finding in an impeachment proceeding to a 
committee, invoking the political question doctrine and reading the text of 
the Impeachment Trial Clause to prevent judicial review.
230
 
 
 
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439–40 (1998) (striking down presidential line-item veto).  
 226. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892). In dicta, the Ballin Court provided that legislative 
rules may not “ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights.” Id. at 5. A third 
enumerated limitation, that there exists a reasonable relation between a rule and the desired end, has 
never been applied by the Court and conflicts with the language quoted in the above text. As a result, 
some commentators doubt its force, concluding that, in spite of these limitations, “Ballin supports a 
very expansive interpretation of the Rulemaking Clause,” which the Court has continually confirmed. 
Roberts, supra note 213, at 532.  
 227. Ballin, 144 U.S. at 5.  
 228. See Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 15, at 1021–23.  
 229. See Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 15, at 556. For instance, in United States v. 
Smith, when the Senate, pursuant to its own rules, recalled the resolution confirming the appointment 
of George Smith to the Federal Power Commission, the Court interpreted such rules to conclude that 
the Senate did not have power to reconsider the nomination. 286 U.S. 6 (1932). Christoffel v. United 
States held in favor of a witness who argued that he could not be convicted of perjury because the 
House Committee to which he gave testimony lacked a quorum as defined in the legislative rules. The 
dissent argued that the Court must presume that Congress follows its rules. 338 U.S. 84 (1949). 
Finally, in Yellin v. United States, the petitioner, who had been convicted of contempt of Congress for 
refusing to answer a question from a House committee, argued that the committee did not follow its 
own rules in failing to consider the petitioner’s request for a closed session. The Court reversed the 
petitioner’s conviction, reasoning that the committee rule bestowed a right upon the witness. 374 U.S. 
109, 114–15 (1963). Smith, Christoffel, and Yellin all involved congressional violations of legislative 
rules in the context of the abridgment of fundamental rights bestowed by such rules and do not support 
general review of the legislative process. 
 230. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–38 (1993). The Nixon decision is often contrasted 
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The judicial reluctance to review legislative rules is in accordance with 
its unwillingness to review the legislative process as a general matter. The 
Court has held, for instance, that the due process clause does not apply to 
legislatures
231
 and has failed to adopt a “due process of lawmaking” in 
spite of academic calls for such judicial inquiry.
232
 Field v. Clark, which 
was decided the same year as Ballin and pronounced the enrolled bill 
doctrine discussed above,
233
 did not involve a direct interpretation of the 
Rulemaking Clause but can be viewed as the Clause’s analogue, protecting 
even egregious errors from judicial review so long as the bill is certified as 
enrolled by the appropriate officer.
234
  
2. Munoz-Flores and the Rulemaking Power 
These precedents display the Court’s unwillingness to review 
legislative process, though it could be argued that the Court has 
specifically opted out of this principle in the Origination Clause context. 
Munoz-Flores, for instance, recognizes the general justiciability of the 
Clause and specifically lies in tension with the Field holding.
235
 As one 
scholar has argued, the two cases “cannot peacefully coexist” since it is 
illogical for the judiciary “to police Article I’s ‘Origination Clause’ 
requirement (which focuses on where a bill started, not whether it was 
ever passed), but not to police Article I’s requirement of bicameral 
 
 
with the Court’s approach in Powell v. McCormack, which held justiciable the question of whether 
Congress had the authority to exclude a member who had been elected to office amidst scandal. Powell 
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). In Powell, the Court declined to apply the political question 
doctrine; instead, the Court held that it was simply interpreting the House’s power to be the judge of 
the qualifications of its own members under Article I, Section 5, Clause 1, as expressly limited by 
Clause 2 of the same section’s criteria for membership (age, residency, and citizenship). Id. Although 
Powell affirms that judicial review of the internal workings of Congress is not entirely off-limits, it 
differs from Nixon, and the interpretation of the Senate’s power to amend revenue legislation, since 
Powell involved an express provision of the Constitution that limited the rulemaking power. See 
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 237. The express limitations on Congress’s membership requirements at issue in 
Powell thus stand in contrast with the Senate’s duty to “try” impeachments at issue in Nixon or the 
Senate’s amendment power under the Origination Clause, the details of which are textually committed 
to the Senate by the Constitution.  
 231. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
 232. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976). 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 67–71. 
 234. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 
1773, 1790 n.63 (2003) (describing the enrolled bill doctrine “as an analytical corollary to the 
Rulemaking Clause”).  
 235. See supra text accompanying notes 67–76. For illustration of the tension between Munoz-
Flores and Field, see Vikram David Amar, Why the ‘Political Question Doctrine’ Shouldn’t 
Necessarily Prevent Courts from Asking Whether a Spending Bill Actually Passed Congress: Part Two 
in a Series, FINDLAW (Apr. 13, 2006), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20060413.html. 
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approval as a precondition for lawmaking.”236 Although the Munoz-Flores 
Court attempted to distinguish Field because it did not implicate a 
constitutional provision, it is difficult to see how Field did not involve the 
Presentment Clause’s bicameral requirements for bill passage.237 
Perhaps the two cases can be resolved because the enrolled bill 
doctrine rests on prudential considerations that are not as serious in the 
origination context. Certainly at the time Field was decided, verifying the 
text of a bill might present practical difficulties. For instance, looking to 
the legislative journals to determine what texts were enacted would create 
significant uncertainty as to the status of the law since the journals were 
considered unreliable. By contrast, ascertaining where, in fact, a bill 
originated is straightforward in today’s world. The technological 
advancements that make such an inquiry possible, however, have also 
resulted in the improvement of legislative record-keeping, thus calling into 
question the traditional justifications for the enrolled bill doctrine.
238
  
All of this does not mean that because the Court can easily determine 
the location of a bill’s origination, regardless of its label, it can also readily 
answer whether the purpose of a tax provision is revenue-raising or 
regulatory, or whether an amendment is germane to the original house bill, 
or whether a bill increases or decreases revenues. If modern-day realities 
warrant overturning the enrolled bill doctrine, which the Munoz-Flores 
Court seems to have partially accomplished, they do not also warrant 
general review of the legislative process. Instead, prudential considerations 
continue to justify the judiciary’s aversion to such review in the 
Origination Clause context generally.  
Nonetheless, as a textual matter, one could contend that the Origination 
Clause simply trumps the separation of powers principles underlying the 
Field decision. Reading the Presentment Clause in conjunction with the 
Rulemaking Clause, Congress’s authority over its rules may mandate that 
it determines the means by which a bill is certified as “passed.” Thus, 
because the Presentment Clause does not set forth detailed requirements as 
to what constitutes a passed bill, the Constitution leaves the interpretation 
to Congress, which has chosen to bestow authority on the presiding 
legislative officers as to the verification of a bill’s contents.239  
 
 
 236. Amar, supra note 235.  
 237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3. 
 238. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Legislative Supremacy in the United States?: Rethinking the “Enrolled 
Bill” Doctrine, 97 GEO. L.J. 323, 334–35 (2009) (discussing technological developments that call into 
question the historical basis for the enrolled bill doctrine). 
 239. Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial 
Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1178–79 (2003). Admittedly, the Presentment Clause does not reference 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/6
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Specific constitutional provisions, on the other hand, limit 
congressional authority. For instance, Congress may not pass a one-house 
legislative veto because it falls outside the general framework of the 
Presentment Clause.
240
 Thus, although each house may decide the question 
of whether a bill has passed, Congress may not circumvent the 
requirement that a bill pass both the House and the Senate before the bill 
becomes law. Similarly, the Origination Clause’s clear directive forecloses 
Congress from having the freedom to certify where the bill originates. The 
ambiguity of the Senate’s amendment power, however, establishes no such 
clear directive, and accordingly the legislative process avoidance doctrine 
should govern to interpret the power broadly. 
3. Theories of Judicial Review of the Legislative Process 
Of course, a legislative process avoidance doctrine is premised on the 
view that judicial review of the legislative process is undesirable. Ittai 
Bar-Siman-Tov has recently argued the contrary—that constitutional 
theories can be marshaled in favor of such review.
241
 Bar-Siman-Tov first 
relies upon H.L.A. Hart, who posits that a legal system must have “rules of 
recognition” or criteria for identifying the legal rules of the system.242 
According to Hart, courts decide whether a law has been violated and thus 
cannot help but determine the content of the laws.
243
 In so doing, they 
must only enforce those laws that meet the rules of recognition, and thus, 
according to Bar-Siman-Tov, the courts must necessarily have the 
authority to determine whether laws were validly enacted.
244
 Importantly, 
Bar-Siman-Tov argues that this justifies judicial review of both 
constitutional and extraconstitutional rules of procedure.  
 
 
the authoritativeness of each House and indeed differs from other sections that seem to bestow such 
authority. Id. at 1179 (discussing Article I, Section 5’s provision that “Each House shall be the Judge 
of the . . . Qualifications of its own Members” and Article I, Section 3’s language that “The Senate 
shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments” as standing in contrast to the text of the Origination 
and Presentment Clauses). The vagueness left open by the Presentment Clause when read in 
conjunction with each house’s authority over the legislative process, however, supports an implicit 
delegation to Congress. The same is true for the Origination Clause, and in the case of the amendment 
power the text implicitly delegates to the Senate “as on other Bills.” 
 240. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–59 (1983) (holding that a one-house legislative 
veto violated the Presentment Clause). 
 241. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 
91 B.U. L. REV. 1915 (2011); see also H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94–95, 100–10 (2d ed. 
1994). 
 242. Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 241, at 1944–51. 
 243. HART, supra note 241, at 97. 
 244. Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 241, at 1946. 
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I have acknowledged that judicial review of certain constitutional 
procedural rules, like the bicameralism requirement or the place of 
origination, is justified and follows from the principle of sovereignty of 
the people, rather than the legislature. I disagree, however, that judicial 
review of extraconstitutional procedural rules is desirable or even 
supported by Hart’s rules of recognition. First, as Bar-Siman-Tov himself 
recognizes, some of Hart’s statements appear to be antithetical to judicial 
review of the legislative process. For instance, Hart writes that “the rules 
of recognition . . . need not refer to all the details of procedure involved in 
legislation.”245 Thus, because some legislative rules do not speak to the 
legitimacy of a law but perhaps reflect mere housekeeping, they need not 
be enforced by the judiciary.  
More problematically, if judicial review ultimately derives from a 
directive of the people, either through their constitution or 
extraconstitutional norms, then one must confront the possibility that the 
people have chosen judicial enforcement of some constitutional provisions 
or extraconstitutional norms and not others. Our current system embraces 
the endogeneity of legislative rules, and this appears to have been the case 
since the founding. If there is space for Bar-Siman-Tov’s argument as a 
theoretical matter, American tradition has explicitly rejected such an 
option. Moreover, in the matter at hand, the text of the amendment power 
can be read to place its interpretation squarely within Congress, a reading 
that is reinforced by this longstanding norm against reviewability of 
legislative rules.
246
 
To be sure, a different result may be justified when a violation of 
legislative rules results from a defect or failure in the political process, 
such as vote dilution or even dominance by interest groups.
247
 Process 
 
 
 245. HART, supra note 241, at 96.  
 246. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS 1074 (5th ed. 2009) (“There is no doubt that Congress can disregard its own 
procedural rules concerning how it adopts statutes, assuming these rules are not constitutionally 
required. This is true even if the rules are contained in a prior statute, rather than in a House or Senate 
resolution.”). This reading also places the Senate’s power to amend revenue legislation largely outside 
of Adler and Dorf’s “constitutional existence conditions” theory, which posits that many 
Constitutional provisions operate as rules of recognition and are thus enforceable. Adler & Dorf, supra 
note 239, at 1107.  
 247. Indeed, I have previously argued that courts, in interpreting ambiguous statutes, can correct 
certain defects in the political process and incentivize Congress to follow its legislative rules by 
assuming each house follows such rules. Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 15; see also 
Rebecca M. Kysar, Penalty Default Interpretative Canons, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 953, 965 (2011) 
(proposing an interpretative methodology whereby courts “refus[e] to question Congress's internal 
rules of procedure in accordance with [Congress’s] rulemaking authority granted by the Constitution”). 
Although this interpretive methodology impacts the legislative process, it does so in accordance with 
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theories, best represented by John Hart Ely’s representation-reinforcing 
theory, charge courts with correcting such defects or failures.
248
 Ely sought 
to overcome the countermajoritarian tendencies of substantive judicial 
review by prescribing court intervention only upon the malfunctioning of 
the political process, thus justifying judicial review of those substantive 
areas that the political process is unlikely to protect.  
Although the process theorists’ approach seems closely connected to 
the judicial review of the legislative process, they differ in important ways. 
First, the purported malfunction of the legislative process, for instance the 
Senate’s failure to follow its own hypothetical germaneness requirement, 
need not represent a failure of the political process.
249
 Indeed, the lack of 
such a requirement may be said to enhance deliberation. A rule violation 
may also be the result of an implicit waiver of the rule by Congress, 
thereby reflecting a valid expression of congressional will or 
interpretation. Second, even if one were to invoke the theory to justify 
judicial review of the legislative process, it does not lead to the conclusion 
that judges should prescribe the details of such process. For instance, if the 
judiciary enforces legislative rules upon the legislature, it still could defer 
to the legislature’s interpretations of such rules. This might be especially 
true where the rules, such as those governing germaneness, are particularly 
difficult to apply. 
Applying these insights to the matter at hand, concerns advanced by the 
process theorists do not justify the Court’s intervention in interpreting the 
Senate’s power to amend revenue legislation. Even if one accepts a 
violation of legislative rules as prima facie evidence of a failure of the 
political process, no such violation occurs here. In fact, the interpretive 
method I prescribe defers to Congress’s own rules in interpreting the 
amendment power, and Congress’s expansive interpretation of this power 
does not result from such a failure.  
B. The Scope of the Senate’s Amendment Power as a Quasi-Political 
Question  
In addition to the Rulemaking Clause and Congress’s inherent 
authority over the legislative process, the political question doctrine is 
 
 
Congress’s own governing principles.  
 248. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–104 
(1980). 
 249. See POPKIN, supra note 246, at 1075 (“It is hard to know whether the rules were purposely 
violated and whether violation undermines a desirable deliberative process.”). 
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another articulation of separation of powers concerns that warrant a 
legislative process avoidance doctrine in the Origination Clause context. 
The Supreme Court enumerated the factors that are indicative of a 
non-justiciable political question in Baker v. Carr: 
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue 
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack 
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
250
 
Scholars have formulated two strands of the political question doctrine, 
and the Baker factors recognize both. The classical strand of the doctrine 
rests on the fact that the Constitution excludes certain issues from judicial 
review, whereas the prudential strand is derived from notions of 
expediency and legitimacy.
251
 The first Baker factor (and perhaps the 
second if used to prove the existence of the first) represents the classical 
theory, and the remaining factors derive from the prudential theory.
252
 
Since Baker was decided, however, the Court has seemed to embrace the 
classical approach, finding only two issues that presented political 
questions and, in so doing, emphasizing the constitutional text committing 
such issues to Congress.
253
  
Both strands of the doctrine support reading the amendment power in a 
way that averts judicial review of the legislative process—that is, broadly. 
The phrase “as on other Bills” commits the decision of the issue to 
Congress by allowing it to determine the scope of the power. This textual 
 
 
 250. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 251. See Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 
YALE L.J. 517 (1966). 
 252. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 265 (2002).  
 253. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1973); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–
38 (1993). In a third case possibly fitting within this category, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), 
four justices, in a plurality opinion, concluded that claims of partisan gerrymandering were 
non-justiciable on political question grounds due to the lack of judicially manageable standards for 
adjudicating such claims. Four justices believed such claims were indeed justiciable, and one justice 
concurred with the ruling of the Court but argued that judicially manageable standards for such claims 
could be developed in the future. Id. 
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anchor is in keeping with the classical strand of the political question 
doctrine and avoids the accusation that the doctrine is fundamentally 
arbitrary. Additionally, prudential considerations have been discussed 
throughout this Article as supporting a broad amendment power. Under 
the Origination Clause, the Senate’s power to “propose or concur with 
Amendments as on other Bills,” fails to provide the Court with any 
workable standards as to determining germaneness of an amendment or 
whether the amendment increases or diminishes revenues.
254
 Furthermore, 
resolution of these issues would involve policy determinations of a 
nonjudicial sort or otherwise manifest a lack of respect due Congress by 
requiring the Court to delve deeply into the Senate’s internal deliberations 
and proceedings.  
The Munoz-Flores Court’s rejection of the political question doctrine 
as to the determination of the origin of a revenue bill can be distinguished. 
Such a determination does not implicate the institutional limitations of the 
Court, nor does it involve judicial interpretation of the vagaries of the 
legislative process since the inquiry is straightforward. Additionally, 
although the Origination Clause may “textually commit” to Congress the 
determination of the amendment power through the “as on other Bills” 
phrase, no such text commits to Congress the judging of the origin of the 
bill. 
To be sure, the political question doctrine faces serious challenges,
255
 
and, given its rare invocation, its stability as a doctrinal matter is in 
 
 
 254. For instance, the fixed meaning of qualifications of congressional members as set forth in 
Article I, Section 2 provided the Court with judicially manageable standards to judge the House’s 
exclusion of Representative Powell on a ground other than those qualifications. Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S. 486 (1969). In contrast, the Senate’s power to “try” impeachments under Article I, Section 3, 
Clause 6, lacked such specificity, thereby failing to supply judicially manageable standards for review. 
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–38. The amendment power is akin to the latter since it also lacks specificity. 
See supra text accompanying note 230. 
 255. Jonathan R. Siegel, Political Questions and Political Remedies, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION 
DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 243, 243 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & 
Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007) (“The puzzling and troubling feature of the political question doctrine is the 
potential it seems to have to render constitutional provisions meaningless.”). The initial debate over 
the political question doctrine rested on whether judicial review is discretionary. Judge Hand argued 
that courts should strike down government acts only rarely and that the political question doctrine 
allowed the judiciary to avoid non-pressing issues. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958). In a 
direct response to Hand’s argument, Wechsler countered that the classic defense of judicial review 
demands review of nearly all constitutional questions. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–10 (1959). Later Bickel argued that nothing prevented the 
judiciary from deciding only certain constitutional issues, but that the judiciary should only invoke the 
political question doctrine to dismiss cases that are governed by “circumstantial and varying” 
principles. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 187 (1962) (advancing the prudential strand of the doctrine). Modern scholars 
critique the doctrine on other grounds. Louis Henkin has argued that the Court either reaches the 
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question. Nonetheless, its underpinnings may still inform an interpretive 
approach regarding the Origination Clause. Although the political question 
doctrine may not bar judicial review of all challenges under the 
Origination Clause, as the Munoz-Flores Court held, the Court’s general 
interpretation of the Origination Clause in a manner avoiding review of the 
legislative process follows many of the considerations expressed in the 
political question doctrine.
256
 Accordingly, the legislative process 
avoidance doctrine I have proposed herein may be categorized as a 
variation on the political question doctrine. 
The political question doctrine has long been a favorite among those 
embracing constitutional review by the coordinate branches.
257
 
Chemerinsky, for instance, invokes the doctrine to support his view that 
“for each part of the Constitution one branch of government is assigned 
the role of final arbiter of disputes.”258 The case for deferring to Congress 
is especially convincing in the context of congressional procedure both 
because of the judiciary’s limitations in judging its content, as well as 
Congress’s strengths in so doing. Congress actively interprets and enforces 
the Origination Clause, and through its intimate experience with its own 
intricate rules of procedure is best left to judge germaneness and other 
limitations on the Senate’s amendment power.259 In contrast, the judiciary, 
it is sometimes said, is best left to protect individual liberties and 
 
 
merits of a claim or disposes of a claim on other grounds, never actually applying the political question 
doctrine to avoid judicial review. Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE 
L.J. 597, 600 (1976). Redish responded to Henkin’s article, arguing that, in fact, the doctrine does 
exist, but that the role of judicial review in a constitutional democracy is cause for abandonment of it. 
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1059–60 
(1985). McCormack argues that the political question doctrine cannot exist as a logical matter since 
dismissing a challenge to governmental action is equivalent to upholding the action. Wayne 
McCormack, The Justiciability Myth and the Concept of Law, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 595, 614 
(1987). Others have contended that the political question doctrine is justified because political 
branches may enforce upon themselves judicially unenforceable constitutional provisions. See J. Peter 
Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 156–62 (1988); see 
also Barkow, supra note 252, at 329 (positing that the political branches are better than the judiciary at 
enforcing certain constitutional provisions). Jonathan Siegel disputes this view, arguing that the 
mandatory nature of judicial review, its resolution of precise issues, its deliberative character, and the 
use of precedent deem it a superior mechanism for resolving constitutional disputes. Siegel, supra, at 
244.  
 256. Redish, supra note 255 at 1032–33 (arguing that courts often implicitly invoke the principles 
underlying the political question doctrine). 
 257. Rachel E. Barkow, The Rise and Fall of the Political Question Doctrine, in THE POLITICAL 
QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 255, at 23, 41. 
 258. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 84 (1987). 
 259. To analogize, the political question doctrine remains vibrant in the area of foreign relations, 
which involves equally “delicate” and “complex” questions “of a kind for which the Judiciary has 
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.” See Barkow, supra note 252, at 329 (quoting Chi. & S. 
Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)). 
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minorities from the oppression of the majority.
260
 Although the 
Origination Clause, at some level, implicates individual rights to fair 
revenue policy, it is closer to the spectrum of those questions concerning 
the structure of government that are properly left to the popular 
branches.
261
  
C. The Continued Effect of the Origination Clause 
One could argue that a broad understanding of the amendment power 
renders the Origination Clause a nullity. For instance, a germaneness 
requirement allows the House to serve as gatekeeper for any legislative 
changes, as well as to define the boundaries of such change. Absent a 
germaneness requirement, the House may only do the former, a result it 
can reach by simply refusing to pass revenue bills. As I have argued 
elsewhere, however, although a broad amendment power dilutes the 
Clause, the House still enjoys an agenda-setting advantage.
262
 The House 
gains this advantage from its ability to frame the political debate.
263
  
Political scientists have explored the importance of agenda setting, 
most often as between the executive branch and Congress,
264
 but empirical 
work also suggests that the first-mover advantage accrues in the 
intra-congressional context as well.
265
 For instance, if the House proposes 
a tax cut, the public will likely look unfavorably upon a Senate’s 
 
 
 260. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 896 (1983). 
 261. It could thus be said that aspects of the Origination Clause fall within that category of 
constitutional questions that lend themselves to final decision by Congress. For enumeration of such 
questions, see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
 262. See Kysar, supra note 1, at 40–41 (illustrating this phenomenon through the Condorcet 
voting paradox). For a general discussion of the importance of agenda setting, see FRANK R. 
BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1993); 
ROGER W. COBB & CHARLES D. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE DYNAMICS OF 
AGENDA-BUILDING (1972); JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d 
ed. 1995); WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE 
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982). 
 263. See Kysar, supra note 1. 
 264. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. WAYNE, THE LEGISLATIVE PRESIDENCY 16 (1978); Lars 
Willnat, Agenda Setting and Priming: Conceptual Links and Differences, in COMMUNICATION AND 
DEMOCRACY: EXPLORING THE INTELLECTUAL FRONTIERS IN AGENDA-SETTING THEORY 51, 58 
(Maxwell McCombs et al. eds., 1997). 
 265. See, e.g., Gerald S. Strom and Barry S. Rundquist, A Revised Theory of Winning in House-
Senate Conferences, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 448, 450 (1977) (“[T]he chamber that acts first on a bill 
tends to have the greatest impact on the content of a bill . . . .”); see also Donald A. Gross, House-
Senate Conference Committees: A Comparative-State Perspective, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 769 (1980); 
Dennis S. Ippolito, House-Senate Budget Conferences: Institutional and Strategic Advantages, 11 AM. 
POL. Q. 71 (1983).  
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counter-proposal of a tax increase. This is not simply because people do 
not like paying taxes but because the House, through its agenda-setting, 
has shaped voters’ preferences. Once the House proposes the tax cut, 
voters then feel entitled to its benefits, causing them to greatly value the 
tax cut (thereby increasing the House bill’s chance of passage in the 
Senate).  
Even though the House can only prevent the Senate from proposing 
revenue policy by not originating any revenue bills, the House’s ability to 
set the political conversation and negotiating stage on the revenue front is 
valuable. Indeed, the Origination Clause appears to informally affect the 
path of revenue legislation by establishing a norm that, even where the 
Senate uses the shell bill game, it does so only where the House has 
previously acted on an issue.
266 The House’s special role in originating 
revenue policy is confirmed by the large number of members, staff, and 
resources devoted to the House Ways and Means Committee and the 
prestige associated with a seat on the committee, as compared with other 
committees in the House.
267
 The Senate Finance Committee does not share 
such glory in the Senate. As a practical matter, the House remains closer to 
tax issues than the Senate even after decades of acquiescing to the shell 
bill game and a broad Senate amendment power. 
It could further be argued that, from a functionalist perspective, the 
original justifications for the Origination Clause are no longer relevant and 
thus strict enforcement of it should be abandoned. It is true that because of 
the Seventeenth Amendment, which mandated direct election of the 
Senate, the differences between the two houses are less stark. Moreover, 
gerrymandering has cast into doubt the proposition that the House is more 
responsive to the populace because it is more frequently elected. 
Gerrymandering not only distorts the “one person, one vote” principle, but 
also appears to insulate incumbents.
268
  
Still, although the Clause was intended to bring revenue policy closer 
to the people, it also was drafted to protect the interests of the large states. 
 
 
 266. In the case of the Affordable Care Act, the House had already drafted a health care reform 
bill, but the Senate chose the shell bill route for political reasons. See infra text accompanying notes 
276–77. In that context, it could be argued that the shell bill tactic was particularly appropriate given 
that the House had already acted on the issue. The 1986 Tax Reform Act followed a similar path. 
Although that legislation was the result of the shell bill tactic, the original House bill also addressed 
tax reform.  
 267. Charles Stewart III, Congress and the Constitutional System, in THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 
3, 21 (Paul J. Quirk & Sarah A. Binder eds., 2005).  
 268. Easterbrook, supra note 34, at 1334–35 (hypothesizing that gerrymandering is responsible for 
the longer tenure of House Representatives). 
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Because the House is the only body that is proportionately representative, 
it still serves this role. To the extent the interests of small states differ from 
large states, the Clause thus continues to serve a meaningful function. For 
instance, the alternative minimum tax disproportionally harms high tax 
states, such as California, New York, and Illinois, by denying the 
deduction for state and local taxes. Because they are often more populated, 
high tax states are less represented in the Senate. The Senate’s filibuster 
exacerbates the extent to which small states can dominate national policy 
by giving the power to block legislation to forty Senators.
269
 Other 
examples of current policies that may harm more heavily populated states 
are limitations on mortgage interest and the failure to geographically index 
the Code.
270
 Giving less control over revenue policy to the House might 
cause such policies to be even more punishing to the large states.  
The Clause may also influence the deliberative model of revenue 
policy through ancillary effects. First, the Clause establishes a classical 
model through which revenue legislation is often shaped. Following this 
norm, revenue legislation often begins with the House Ways and Means 
Committee and ends with a conference to resolve differences between the 
two houses.
271
 Although not all revenue legislation follows this path, the 
model endures and indeed is often used for tax bills of particular 
importance, such as the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
272
 Second, the 
Origination Clause gives more power to the tax committees, thus arguably 
encouraging deliberation.
273
 Because the Clause creates a “classical” path 
of tax legislation, the Ways and Means Committee benefits from being the 
typical starting point. Additionally, under the Origination Clause, the 
Senate cannot pursue revenue amendments on non-revenue bills, which 
would otherwise remove authority from the Senate Finance Committee. 
The Clause thus establishes norms that may benefit the democratic 
process in unexpected ways. Additionally, although modern 
developments, such as gerrymandering and the Seventeenth Amendment, 
 
 
 269. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE: REVISED TO JANUARY 24, 2013, S. DOC. NO 113-18, at 
15–17 (Rule XXII: Precedence of Motions). 
 270. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Regional Cost-of-Living Adjustments in Tax/Transfer Schemes, 51 
TAX L. REV. 175 (1996) (discussing the tax system’s failure to address cost-of-living differences 
among regions). 
 271. One might further contend that because the Senate and Executive branch can informally 
influence the shape of revenue policy before any legislation is drafted, this negates any first-mover 
advantage that the House might enjoy. Although such informal input cabins the discretion later 
exercised by the House, its first-mover advantage is still valuable since it “holds the pen” in first 
articulating the policy details.  
 272. See Evans, supra note 13. 
 273. Id.  
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have muted the democratic benefits that the Founders originally 
envisioned for the Clause, the Clause remains one of the only tools in 
which the large states can combat the influence of the small States—an 
influence which has been strengthened by the filibuster. Enforcement of 
the Clause thus continues to preserve the bargain struck by the Great 
Compromise. Nonetheless, the bargain also granted to the Senate the 
power to amend revenue bills, a power which I have explained herein 
should be read broadly as a constitutional matter. In fact, solely from a 
policy perspective, an expansive reading of the Senate’s amendment 
power may best allocate influence between the two houses. Because it 
preserves the House’s powerful agenda-setting ability while also giving 
flexibility to the Senate to act upon revenue policy, this interpretation 
recognizes that modern developments between the two houses have 
obscured some of their differences while also acknowledging that the 
Clause still serves important functions. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UNDER 
THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE 
In this Article, I have constructed a conceptual framework for 
analyzing the Court’s jurisprudence under the Origination Clause and 
advanced it from a theoretical perspective. This proposed legislative 
process avoidance doctrine, which deflects searching review of the 
legislative process, predicts and justifies an expansive reading of the 
Senate’s power to amend revenue legislation. In this Part, I apply this 
framework to analyze a recent challenge to the Affordable Care Act under 
the Origination Clause, Sissel v. United States Department of Health and 
Human Services.
274
 
A. The Enactment of Health Care Reform 
The procedural history of health care reform is complex, but a short 
summary will suffice for the discussion at hand.
275
 On November 7, 2009, 
the House passed a health care reform bill, H.R. 3962, by a narrow 
margin.
276
 Reluctant to engage directly Senate debate on some of the 
 
 
 274. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t. of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10-cv-01263 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2012). 
 275. For a detailed account of the passage of health care reform, see BARBARA SINCLAIR, 
UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (4th ed. 2012). 
 276. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) was 
passed by a vote of 220 to 215. 
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House bill’s controversial provisions, Senate Majority Leader Reid did not 
wish to use it as the basis for the Senate’s competing plan.277 Instead, the 
Senate drafted its own health care bill, which replaced the text of a “shell” 
bill, H.R. 3590, in order to comply with the Origination Clause. The 
House had earlier originated the shell bill, passing it on October, 8, 
2009.
278
 At a modest eight pages long, the shell bill expanded and 
extended a homebuyers’ tax credit for members of the armed forces, the 
costs of which were offset by an eleven dollar increase in the monthly 
penalty for failure to file a partnership or S corporation return, and a half-
percentage point increase in the amount of corporate estimated taxes for 
large corporations.
279
 In its over two thousand pages, the Senate text that 
replaced the House text contained the majority of the health care law, 
including the individual mandate.
280
 The Senate passed H.R. 3590 on 
December 24, 2009 by a sixty vote supermajority, just enough to stave off 
a filibuster. The amended bill, which was now called the Affordable Care 
Act, was sent to the House, where it would face an uphill battle. 
There were key differences between the House and Senate plans, which 
were yet to be ironed out by the time the Democrats lost their sixtieth vote 
in the Senate upon the election of Scott Brown on January 19, 2010.
281
 
Because the changes necessary to ensure House passage of the Senate plan 
would almost certainly invoke threat of a filibuster in the Senate, 
Democrats developed a different strategy. On March 21, 2010, the House 
passed the Senate plan but also originated and passed a separate 
reconciliation bill, H.R. 4872, which contained changes essential to the 
House’s cooperation.282 The reconciliation bill, under the protections of 
the reconciliation process, required only a bare majority in the Senate, and 
was passed by the Senate on March 25, 2010. After being signed by the 
President on March 30, 2010, the reconciliation bill became law and is 
referred to as the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010.
283
 Together with the Affordable Care Act, which was signed into 
law on March 23, 2010, these two laws comprise federal health care 
reform. 
 
 
 277. Joseph Arminio, Congressman Gohmert says Obamacare, new security force, ‘appeared out 
of nowhere’, WND (Dec. 29, 2011, 12:20 AM), http://www.wnd.com/2011/12/381801/.  
 278. Serv. Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). 
 279. Id.  
 280. Patient Prot. & Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). 
 281. Michael Cooper, GOP Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010, at A1. 
 282. Health Care and Educ. Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010). 
 283. Pub. L. No. 111-152 (Mar. 30, 2010).  
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B. The Individual Mandate and the Scope of the Origination Clause 
Under the jurisprudence of the Origination Clause as described and 
theorized in this Article, the individual mandate should and likely will fall 
within the Clause’s scope. Although Congress designed the individual 
mandate to induce individuals to purchase health insurance, this should not 
negate its revenue-raising function. Revenues collected from the mandate 
indirectly assist the government in administering other aspects of 
healthcare reform. Nonetheless, because the revenues are not earmarked 
and instead fund the general “expenses or obligations of the 
government,”284 the Court will likely not view them as funding a specific 
program or purpose. Neither do they resemble quid pro quo arrangements 
that lower courts have ruled fall outside the scope of the Origination 
Clause.
285
  
The NFIB Court’s characterization of the mandate as a tax for purposes 
of the taxing power does not necessarily mean it will fall within the scope 
of the Origination Clause. As explored above, the two inquiries are not the 
same.
286
 They do, however, overlap. The NFIB Court reasoned that the 
regulatory purposes of the mandate did not turn the mandate into a 
penalty. Similarly, the Court should and will likely conclude that the 
mandate’s regulatory purposes do not erase its revenue-raising function.287  
That being said, the D.C. District Court came to an opposite conclusion 
in recent litigation involving an Origination Clause challenge to the 
Affordable Care Act.
288
 The Sissel court reasoned that, under Supreme 
 
 
 284. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 203 (1897). 
 285. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Michels v. James, 26 F. Cas. 577, 578 (C.C.N.Y. 1875) 
(holding that a bill to increase postage rates did not fall within the Origination Clause’s definition of a 
revenue bill because citizens received postal service in return). 
 286. For one, the Court, in conducting an Origination Clause analysis, focuses on whether a 
provision raises general revenue rather than probes the tax/penalty distinction as in the taxing power 
context. See Mason, supra note 109, at 1030; United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) 
(focusing on the use of revenues rather than the penalty-like features of the special assessment at 
issue). See also text accompanying note 109 (hypothesizing that federalism concerns in the taxing 
power context drive this distinction).  
 287. The NFIB Court did express a view that the mandate could be a tax for one purpose and not 
another, holding that the mandate was not a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act but still within 
Congress’s taxing power. The Court reasoned that Congress’s failure to describe the mandate as a tax 
was only fatal to inclusion under the former because it is within Congress’s discretion to decide 
whether to apply the Anti-Injunction Act, but it is not within Congress’s discretion to determine the 
limits of its powers. Nat’l Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012); see also Ellen 
P. Aprill, The Impact of Agency Procedures and Judicial Review on Tax Reform, 65 NAT’L TAX. J. 4, 
918–920 (2012) (discussing Congress’s motivation in enacting the Anti-Injunction Act). Congress’s 
label should likewise be irrelevant for purposes of the Origination Clause. So long as a provision 
functions like a tax, Congress has the freedom to label it in the manner most politically expedient. 
 288. Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, No. 1:10-cv-01263 (D.D.C. June 28, 2013).  
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Court case law, a bill must “levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word” and 
cannot be “for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.”289 
Because Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act to expand health 
insurance coverage, according to the court, it fell outside the scope of the 
Clause. I discussed above in Part II why institutional limitations will likely 
make the Supreme Court hesitant to delve into the purposes of legislation 
in making a determination as to the Clause’s scope. I also concluded that, 
as a substantive constitutional law matter, there is a strong case for 
including regulatory taxes within the Clause’s scope. Although I think the 
D.C. District Court’s conclusion is incorrect in this regard, its reasoning 
on the scope of the amendment power follows my own, as discussed 
below. 
C. The Constitutionality of The Affordable Care Act’s Shell Bill Game 
If the mandate falls within the scope of the Origination Clause, the next 
issue is whether the Senate’s shell bill game violates the Clause. As 
discussed above, institutional limitations should and will likely prevent the 
Court from holding the shell bill tactic unconstitutional.
290
 The Court does 
not venture into assessing the germaneness of a Senate amendment to the 
original revenue bill. Although it could be argued that the shell bill 
approach is prima facie evidence of germaneness, thereby saving the Court 
from wading into the legislative process, in reality such a rule would be 
both over- and under-inclusive.
291
 Additionally, Congress’s position that 
no germaneness requirement exists is well-supported by constitutional 
text, history, and precedent. 
Indeed, citing an earlier draft of this Article, the Sissel court reasoned 
that a germaneness requirement would impermissibly limit the Senate’s 
amendment power and that, even if such a requirement existed, it was a 
non-justiciable question.
292
 The court argued that although Munoz-Flores 
allows review of whether a provision is a “Bill[] for raising revenue,” the 
lack of a textually explicit germaneness requirement makes such an 
inquiry beyond the scope of the judiciary.
293
 The court then concluded that 
the text of the Clause commits to Congress the ability to define the scope 
of the Senate’s amendment power, which under the political question 
 
 
 289. Id. at 12 (citing Twin City Nat. Bank of New Brighton v. Nebecker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 
(1987)) (emphasis in original). 
 290. See supra text accompanying note 172; see also supra notes 173–83 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text. 
 292. Sissel, No. 1:10-cv-01263 at 17.  
 293. Id. at 20. 
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doctrine and along with the Rulemaking Clause, makes the question non-
justiciable, thus adopting much of my reasoning herein. 
Although the Sissel plaintiff did not set forth the argument in his 
complaint (and thus the Sissel court did not reach it),
294
 perhaps a more 
convincing path to unconstitutionality would be the contention that the 
Origination Clause applies only to revenue-increasing measures. 
Specifically, the Sissel plaintiff could have argued that the original House 
bill, H.R. 3590, did not raise revenues within the meaning of the 
Origination Clause, but the Senate amendment in fact did, in violation of 
the Origination Clause. 
Although the Congressional Budget Office did not make a formal 
revenue estimate of the shell bill, the bill was almost certainly 
revenue-neutral. This is because statutory and internal pay-as-you-go rules 
require that tax cuts be offset by tax increases or spending cuts.
295
 The 
House bill gave tax breaks to members of the military. According to the 
bill’s executive summary, it offset those costs with an increase in filing 
penalties as well as the amount of required corporate estimated tax 
payments.
296
 Although it is possible that those provisions would have 
brought in more revenue than the military tax breaks, it is very unlikely 
given their express designation as revenue offsets. Even if the plaintiffs 
cannot prove revenue neutrality, Congress intended the bill to be revenue 
neutral. During the debates of the bill, several members expressed that 
their support, in part, was based on its revenue-neutrality.
297
 
In contrast to the shell bill, the Senate’s amendment increases 
revenues. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the amended 
bill would reduce federal deficits by $118 million over the 2010–2019 
period,
298
 and the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that its 
 
 
 294. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10-cv-01263 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 2012).  
 295. Kysar, supra note 152. 
 296. H.R. 3590: SERVICE MEMBERS HOME OWNERSHIP TAX ACT OF 2009, LEGISLATIVE DIGEST, 
available at http://www.gop.gov/bill/111/1/hr3590 (describing the increase in penalties and estimated 
tax payments as offsets to the cost of the tax credit extension). 
 297. 155 CONG. REC. H10551 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2009) (statement of Rep. John Tanner 
characterizing the bill as “completely bipartisan and, more importantly, or as importantly, fully paid 
for”); 155 CONG. REC. H10552 (daily ed. Oct, 7, 2009) (statement of Rep. Ron Kind that the bill “will 
not add a nickel to our national deficit”); 155 CONG. REC. H10552 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2009) (statement 
of Rep. Bob Etheridge indicating that the bill is fully paid for); 155 CONG. REC. E2459 (daily ed. Oct. 
6, 2009) (statement of Rep. Al Green discussing revenue neutrality of bill). 
 298. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, LETTER TO SENATOR HARRY REID PROVIDING REPORT OF 
COST ESTIMATE OF H.R. 3590, PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (Mar. 11, 2010), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11307/reid_letter_hr35 
90.pdf. 
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revenue-related provisions would increase revenues by nearly $400 billion 
in that period.
299
 As discussed above, however, this argument is also 
unpersuasive, and the Court would likely refrain from interpreting 
revenue-raising to mean solely revenue-increasing or to prevent the 
Senate from altering the revenue impacts of House bills through its 
amendment power. As a substantive constitutional matter and discussed in 
this Article, text, history, and precedent support Congress’s interpretation 
that the Origination Clause encompasses revenue-related bills. They also 
support an amendment power unlimited by the revenue impact of the 
amendment. These interpretations of the Senate’s amendment power are 
also grounded in theories of judicial review and institutional 
considerations, as discussed throughout this Article. Accordingly, the 
argument under the Origination Clause asserting the unconstitutionality of 
the Senate’s shell bill strategy, which it used to enact the individual 
mandate, should fail.
300
 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has long deferred to Congress in matters of taxation. Its 
willingness to police the Origination Clause seems contrary to this general 
deference. In actuality, the Court interprets the Clause in a manner that 
avoids intrusion into the legislative process, thus continuing the view that 
Congress, rather than the judiciary, is the proper audience to address unfair 
taxation. These decisions also confirm that the general legislative purview 
over procedure is very much alive, and for good reason. Theories of 
judicial review and longstanding conceptions of the lawmaking power 
necessitate such a result. Indeed, separation of powers concerns may 
justify a general interpretive method whereby courts construe ambiguous 
 
 
 299. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE MANAGER’S 
AMENDMENT TO THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT” (Dec. 19, 2009). 
 300. Although I predict the failure of the Origination Clause challenge against the Affordable Care 
Act, the legislative avoidance doctrine proposed herein would readily dismiss two arguments advanced 
by the Government in the challenge. First, the Government argues that because language similar to the 
individual mandate originated and was passed in the House in another bill that never became law, this 
somehow cures the constitutional defect. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended 
Complaint, Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 1:10-cv-01263 at 7 n.2 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 
2012). Such an argument would require the Court to decide the similarity of the substance of the two 
bills, a task outside its judicial competence. Second, the Government argues that the second piece of 
health care reform, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, began in the House and 
represented the House’s implicit acceptance of the already passed Affordable Care Act. Id. This 
argument would also necessitate the performance of a non-judicial task by requiring it to assess the 
germaneness between the later enacted statute and the earlier one.  
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constitutional provisions in a manner that avoids searching review of the 
legislative process. Given its entanglement with congressional procedure 
and its textual deference to Congress, the Origination Clause is a 
convincing context for this legislative process avoidance doctrine. 
As a practical matter, this understanding of the Court’s jurisprudence 
under the Origination Clause predicts and prescribes deference to the 
Senate’s expansive interpretation of its power to amend revenue 
legislation, which in turn is supported by constitutional text, history, and 
precedent. Perhaps fittingly given the democratic origins of the Clause, the 
most viable recourse left in challenges to shell bills is a repeal by the most 
accountable branches, rather than an appeal to the least accountable one. 
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